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THE CONFUSION OF CAUSES AND REASONS IN FOREN-




The public perception that criminal conduct is increasingly
excused on psychological grounds, notwithstanding a markedly
small statistical success rate of diminished capacity defenses,'
evinces misplaced frustration over a broader cultural reluctance
or inability to assign moral blame.? Psychology is seen as feed-
ing a kind of determinism that rationalizes evil behavior and
precludes retributive punishment as a matter of scientific prin-
ciple.3 This perception is accurate to the degree that it reveals
our legal system's fundamental confusion of purposes in judging
and explaining criminal behavior. This confusion is engendered
by the indeterminacy of language, which entangles the
verificationist mode and purpose of science with the
aspirational mode and purpose of metaphysics. The difference
between the two linguistic forms roughly corresponds to Ludwig
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., Duquesne
University; M. Div., Yale University; J.D., Saint Louis University.
1. The term "diminished capacity" is employed broadly to refer to situations in
which abnormal psychological components are used either to exonerate a defendant
for not possessing the requisite mens rea of a criminal offense (the "mens rea" vari-
ant) or to diminish a defendant's responsibility for an admitted crime (the "partial
responsibility" variant). See Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished
Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 1 (1984). Diminished capacity is distinct
from the insanity defense, which asserts an impairment of such severity that it pre-
cludes legal responsibility altogether. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
2. See ALAN M. DERSHOWiTZ, THE AnUSE EXCUSE 41 (1994). Dershowitz suggests
that the proliferation of "abuse" syndrome defenses "may be a symptom of a national
abdication of personal responsibility." Id.
3. See JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JuDGMENT 1-21 (1997). Wilson describes the
popular perception that the moral order is in crisis, particularly in light of highly
publicized criminal trials, utilizing "dubious theories of social causation" to explain
defendants' behavior and weaken "essential notions of personal responsibility." Id. at
2.
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Wittgenstein's distinction between propositions expressive of
logical necessity (what can be said) and ethical sensibilities
expressive of transcendent value (what can only be shown).4
The entangling of these forms in forensic psychology becomes
manifest as a merger of causes, which explain actions in imper-
sonal verificationist terms, and reasons, which infuse meanings
to actions through something akin to literary interpretation.
These entangled concepts are discussed in Part II of this paper.
Part III focuses on functional means of tracing attributions of
responsibility to their proximate base in causes or reasons.
First, Part III evaluates Meir Dan-Cohen's distinction between
object-responsibility, which is impelled through a sense of direct
empirical causality, and subject-responsibility, which is impelled
through more complex identifications of a conscious self with
particular objects or events bespeaking causal influence in vary-
ing gradations.' Second, Part III examines Daniel Dennett's
distinction between an intentional stance taken toward another
person, in which the other person is presumed to have essen-
tially the same capacity for reason and beliefs that the observer
has, and the design stance, in which the other person is viewed
mechanistically, as a kind of machine.6 Third, Part III observes
Albert Jonsen's distinction between patterns of appropriation,
composed of questions a defendant might ask to clarify his own
behavior to himself, and patterns of attribution, composed of
questions that a judge would ask in assigning blame and pun-
ishment.' In our interpretation, the impetus to punish another
is driven essentially by an intense projection of something like
subject-responsibility, which can be designated as subject-guilt.
Therefore, the justice of punishment is measured primarily
by reasons as opposed to causes. Critical questions about a
defendant's mental state at a particular moment in the forensic
narrative, which seem like questions of fact to be verified in a
4. See infra notes 22-24.
5. See infra notes 35-38.
6. See DANIEL DENNETT, BRAINSTORMS 336-43 (1980). Descartes employed a kind
of radical design stance toward animals, viewing them as mindless mechanisms. See
RENi DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD, PART V 56-58 (Donald L. Cress trans.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1993) (1637). Ironically, viewing humans as machines allows a
more humane approach to punishment because such persons are not as prone to be
the targets of our own projection. See infra notes 54, 71.
7. See infra note 51.
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scientific mode, are more properly seen as questions of value by
which a "fact finder" infuses meaning into the narrative. This is
accomplished by drawing the emotive boundaries of the selves
who comprise the story.
The conclusion that a defendant is "guilty" in the sense of
warranting retributive punishment is, then, radically dependent
on the quality of the fact finder's own identity base, which
provides the means by which she must compare, project, and
define the identities of others, both defendants and victims.
Scientific expert testimony can offer evidence only of causes,
and causes become influential only as a fact finder translates
them into an unscientific literature of reasons. Justice is a
meaningful concept only because it is unscientific and belongs
to the dimension which, in Wittgenstein's phrase, gives sense to
the world by standing outside it. 8
This is not to say that justice is a Platonic form, but merely
to indicate that justice is such a foundational psychological
concept that it is falsified even by characterizing it as an object
of knowledge that can be expressed in propositional language.
Partly for this reason, one may grasp the phenomenon of guilt
through something close to Saint Augustine's concept of original
sin.'
These insights lay the foundation for additional observations
and comments in Part IV. First, because the question of a
defendant's mental state is not properly characterized as a
question of fact in the ordinary sense, one may question wheth-
er the determination should be made by persons ordinarily
designated as fact finders. Second, because the influence of
expert testimony is only marginally related to its capacity for
verification, present concerns over the scientific integrity of
expert testimony are overdrawn. Third, given the prior two
assertions, the state of mind determination is best left to the
judge who sentences the defendant. This requires some form of
a bifurcation model whereby only clear-cut, empirically-driven
causal questions are given to juries. Fourth, given the second
and third assertions, a wider range of expert testimony should
8. See infra note 22.
9. See SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE ENCHIRMION ON FAITH, HOPE AND LovE 31-32
(Henry Paolucci ed., 1961).
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be permissible, including theoretic modalities presently chal-
lenged as unscientific. Fifth, in light of all prior insights, ever
greater attention must be given to the selection of judges. The
criteria we presently employ should be acknowledged as radical-
ly incomplete.
Although the task of implementing these practical changes
appears Herculean, it will not be so once the legal community
acknowledges what is obvious to others: that the confusion of
causes and reasons is slowly but dreadfully undermining not
only public confidence in the law's capacity to attribute criminal
responsibility, but also in the ability of each of us to think
about morality and guilt, justice and mercy, and good and evil.
II. A TALE OF Two LANGUAGES
Human thought is an interplay of two languages. One is
scientific and provides meaning through definition. The other is
literary and provides meaning through image and connotation.
One seeks verification by testing assertions through elemental
empirical reference or mathematical calculation. The other
evokes aspiration by framing conduct against common sensibili-
ties and intuitive apperceptions. One assumes a grammar of
causes by compelling assent through measurement. The other
assumes a grammar of reasons by giving sense to things
through familiarity. One operates out of a design stance and
accounts for human actions in terms of mechanics. The other
employs an intentional stance and accounts for human actions
in terms of feelings and passions. One presupposes determin-
ism, while the other presumes a posture of free will. One as-
cribes responsibility as a matter of causation, while the other
perceives responsibility as a matter of identity. One appears to
negate guilt. The other appears to attribute guilt.
The intermingling of these languages has riddled the dis-
course of law and psychology with internal contradiction, seem-
ing to set the disciplines at cross purposes both with them-
selves and with one another. In fact, this is a false conflict
largely resolvable by a disentangling of linguistic forms. The
residual dilemma, insoluble in speech, nevertheless, is clarified
to the intellect opening the possibility for a different kind of
110 [Vol. 33:107
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resolution within the human heart, where silence also can be a
mode of discourse.' °
The delimitations of logic confine language to varying degrees
of imprecision. In order to eliminate all traces of ambiguity,
language would need validation from something outside itself,
some superior form of thought free of any form of signification.
But without some form of signification, there can be no lan-
guage, and without language, there can be no thought. Thus, to
think of thought without language is to think of thought with-
out thought, and we cannot think such a thought because then
we would not be thinking. The realization that in some sense
we just did think such a thought by asserting that we could not
does not solve the problem, but illustrates it."
10. Cf MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 208 (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., 1962). Heidegger writes:
Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be
able to keep silent Dasein must have something to say-that is, it must
have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. In that
case one's reticence [Verschwiegenheit] makes something manifest, and
does away with "idle talk" ["Gerade"]. As a mode of discoursing, reticence
Articulates [sic] the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner
that it gives rise to a potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a
Being-with-one-another which is transparent.
Id.
11. What at first glance appears to be a nonsensical word game is actually the
classic impediment to establishing a foundation for mathematical logic. The signifi-
cance of the paradox-technically, the inability adequately to account for a class of all
members of classes who are not members of themselves-is evident by its halting
effect on Bertrand Russell. Russell's work in mathematical logic was seriously under-
mined by his recognition of the problem. See RAY MONK, BERTRAND RUSSELL 142-43,
175-85 (1996).
Russell's illustration is probably the most well known: "The barber shaves all
men in the village who do not shave themselves." Id. at 143. Assuming the barber is
male, the barber is a member of a class (all men in the village), but not a member
of that same class (because all men in the village by definition shave and by defini-
tion cannot shave themselves and be shaved by the barber). If someone other than
the barber shaves him, the barber is not a man in the village; if he shaves himself,
the barber is not the barber.
The same problem is manifest in the ancient liar's paradox attributed to
Epimenides of Crete: "All Cretans are liars." Because Epimenides is a Cretan, the
statement can be true only if it is a lie, and it can be a lie only if it is true.
Russell's resolution was to imply a contextual removal of the problematic class mem-
ber from the class asserted. Just as we assume that Epimenides impliedly exempts
himself from the class of all Cretans, every function of mathematical logic assumes a
level of abstraction impliedly removed from the operations of the function employed.
Of course, the resolution is itself problematic in its contemplation of an infinite re-
gression of levels of abstraction. As Russell came to adopt Wittgenstein's position that
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When deconstructionists speak of the impossibility of read-
ing"2 because there is nothing outside the text, 3 they empha-
size this same conundrum: human language is inherently re-
flexive. Universal assertions cannot be validated because there
is nothing to which the assertions appeal except the language
which composes them, 4 and language cannot be validated
without appealing to something which by definition cannot be
thought." So meanings of words cannot help but be intermina-
bly entangled with meanings of other words. 6 It is our fate to
hack through the endless jungle of associated meanings which
grow around us as fast as we can free ourselves. 7
As a matter of utility, science has developed a language that
is artificially circumscribed. In this language, definition is pos-
sible because the endless multi-directional tentacles of word and
image association have been cut off at the point where mathe-
logic was a fimction of language, he lost interest in the field. See id. at 295-300, 516-
19, 533-35. For a commentary on the liar's paradox and Russell's solution, see HILARY
LAWSON, REFLEXIVITY 15-22 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Living On/Border Lines, in HAROLD BLOOM ET AL.,
DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM 75, 116 (1994). "The impossibility of reading should
not be taken too lightly." Id. (attributing the quote to Paul deMan).
13. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
trans., 1976). Derrida attempts to illumine the mistake of assuming some form of
pure thought apart from signifiers, which leads to further mistakes of assuming dis-
tinctions between words and their meanings, between speech and writing, and be-
tween reading and interpreting. See id. For a narrative manifesting these insights in
relation to formalist principles of literary criticism, see STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A
TExT IN THIS CLASS? 1-17 (1980). For an analysis of formalist literary criticism incar-
nate in contemporary legal theory, see Jeffrey Malkan, Literary Formalism, Legal
Formalism, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393 (1998).
14. For an overview of major post-structuralist theories of textual meaning, see
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 377-96 (1982). For a lucid
account of the indeterminacy of legal language, see Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic
Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 161-88 (1990).
15. See LAWSON, supra note 11 at 15-22; JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION
133-34 (1982).
16. See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, in A DERRIDA READER 6-30
(Peggy Kamuf ed. & David B. Allison trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1991) (critiquing
Edmund Husserl's assertion of a grammar of pure intention); CHRISTOPHER NORRIS,
DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 28-29 (1993) (interpreting Derrida's concept
of writing as "endless displacement of meaning"). See generally CULLER, supra note
15, at 110-34.
17. Such deciphering is an impossible task for any individual. For an explanation
of "interpretive circles," see FISH, supra note 13, at 167-73; John Henry Schlegel, The
Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435, 442-57 (1989) (reviewing LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)).
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matical calculation can verify empirically driven theoretical
constructs."8 We gain much by this linguistic severance. Antibi-
otics, refrigeration, microwave ovens, personal computers,
Prozac, and every tangible benefit woven into contemporary
human living is to one degree or another the proximate result
of scientific method. This method is the proximate result of
definitions whose precondition is the deliberate cutting off of
the thought connections which comprise language. Yet, because
our inherent thought program is cut apart, we lose much also.
In gaining the capacity to speak of molecular structures, we
lose the ability to speak of the meaning of life. In acquiring
prowess over the neurophysiological human animal, we lose the
ability to think seriously about the human soul. In speaking
with ever greater precision about what is, we relegate to an
entirely different and ever more tentative mode of speech any
assertion about what ought to be.'9
The circumscribed language of science is so revered in our
culture that we tend to accept it as the truth of matters. We
accept the language on its own terms. Since scientific language
tells the truth, it deals with facts, or so we perceive. People
cannot dispute scientific facts. People can only dispute matters
of value, and so these disputed matters of value must be ex-
pressed in ostensibly inferior linguistic forms such as poetry,
religion, and philosophy. Thus, the bifurcation of thought-
speech" establishes scientific thought as the privileged founda-
18. See RIcHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 10, 129-213
(1979) (describing the phenomenon of constructing "privileged representations" to gov-
ern thought, thus allowing science and philosophy to speak with an apomictic quali-
ty).
19. See HANS KEISEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 62-67 (1967), reprinted in COHEN
AND COHEN'S READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 516, 521 (Philip
Shuchman ed., 2d ed. 1979) (arguing that the intermingling of the questions of what
law is and what law ought to be incorrectly presupposes an absolute moral order
which, in practical application, "amounts to an uncritical justification of the national
coercive order"); Moritz Schlick, What is the Aim of Ethics? in LOGICAL POSITIVISM
247, 256-63 (A.J. Ayer ed. & David Ryan trans., 1959) (asserting that a science of
ethics can never establish what is "good" by stating what good must or should mean,
but only by verifring in fact whether an established norm is followed). See generally
C.L. Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM, su-
pra, at 264, 280-81 (characterizing as "a great confusion" any attempt to unite the
dynamic use of "good," by which a speaker exerts influence, with a descriptive use,
by which a speaker records or clarifies degrees of correspondence with a truth appre-
hended a priori).
20. The term "thoughtspeech7 is my own. Just as our common sense perception
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:107
tion of true understanding to which other modes of thought are
atavistic derivations, interstitial modes of metaphoric explana-
tion awaiting translation into the truth of unambiguous scientif-
ic terms and relations.21 But, there can be no translation. If
literature were scientific, it would not be literature, and litera-
ture is necessary for human beings to make sense of their lives.
Science cannot do this;22 its language is too limited. Science
bifurcates space and time, which Einstein established as a single dimension, the cur-
vatures of which pose unified interactions, our common sense perception bifurcates
thought and speech, envisioning the latter as an impure reflection of the former. See
CULLER, supra note 15, at 92-94 (relating Derrida's concept of logocentricism to Carte-
sian dualism); DERRIDA, supra note 13, at 158; NORRIS, supra note 16, at 44-55 (ana-
lyzing the difference between voice and text). For an overview of special relativity
theory, see MICHAEL WHITE & JOHN GRIBBIN, EINSTEIN: A LIFE IN SCIENCE 127-41
(1994). For an insightful account of jurisprudential concepts in terms of modern phys-
ics, specifically analogizing the psychological influences of language in "life space" and
"value regions" to field curvatures in spacetime, see Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and
Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950), reprinted in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SE-
LECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 121, 134-35 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960).
21. A scientific language that is both intersubjective (having common and fixed
meanings for all users) and universal (capable of describing any state of affairs of
whatever kind) was the goal of the Vienna Circle philosophers, and remains in some
sense an ideal of linguistic philosophers even though they might doubt the possibility
of accounting for subjective states. See VICTOR KRAFT, THE VIENNA CIRCLE 160-93
(Arthur Pap trans., 1953) (delineating the requisites of a universal language and fo-
cusing on the physicalism of Rudolph Carnap). The Logical Positivist ideal of a uni-
versal language notwithstanding subjective impasses seems analogous to Einstein's
ideal of a unified theory of physics notwithstanding the obstacles posed by quantum
theory. See WHITE & GRIBBEN, supra note 20, at 212-26. See generally A.J. Ayer, In-
troduction to LOGICAL POSITIVISM, supra note 19, at 3-28 (tracing the development of
the Logical Positivist movement beginning with the Vienna Circle).
22. Wittgenstein was always aware of this, and he differed from other pioneers of
Logical Positivism, notably Bertrand Russell, in the significance Wittgenstein attached
to what could not be captured in language. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS
LoGICo PHILOSOPHICUS PROPOSITIONS 6.41, 6.522, 6.53 (B.F. McGuinness et al. eds. &
D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1971) [hereinafter
TRACTATUS]. In Proposition 6.41, Wittgenstein states:
The sense of the world must lie outside the world....
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the
whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and
is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if
it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
Id. at 6.41. For this reason, Wittgenstein states that it is impossible to have proposi-
tions of ethics. See id. at 6.42. "God," Wittgenstein asserts, "does not reveal himself
in the world." Id. at 6.432. Yet Wittgenstein's subsequent comments on the Tractatus
make it clear that he viewed his task of limiting what language could capture as
having considerable ethical significance. See ALLAN JANIK & STEPHEN TOUIJLN,
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was not made for this purpose. The language of science re-
mains, so to speak, a small cultivated garden within the infi-
nite jungle of thoughtspeech. This insight is easily lost because
scientific language itself misleads us into thinking that it is all
that matters. Accordingly, we seek to employ it to explain ev-
erything, insofar as this is possible, and fill in the gaps with
ordinary language. In doing this, we mix not only words, but
also the different human needs for which the words have been
created.
The language of science is directed to the need for causes."
The language of literature is directed to the need for reasons.'
WITTGENSTEIN'S VIENNA 188-91 (1973) (concluding that Wittgenstein's purpose was "as
much ethical as logical"); infra note 55. Toward the end of the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein observes that "Itihere are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words.
They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical." TRACTATUS, supra, at
6.522 (emphasis by the translators). In his Introduction to the Tractatus, Bertrand
Russell expressed "a certain sense of intellectual discomfort" with Wittgenstein's "mys-
tical, inexpressible region" of what can be shown and not said, and considered it a
manifestation of the logical problem of generality. Bertrand Russell, Introduction to
TRACTRATUS, supra, at xxi-xxii. Russell suspected the problem was illusory, but he
could not resolve it. See id.; see also MONK, supra note 11. This difference of attitude
among the destroyers of metaphysics regarding those subjects traditionally addressed
by metaphysics is mirrored in modern literary criticism, and is perhaps the essential
distinction to be made between the old New Critics in the mode of Eliot and Rich-
ards, and contemporary deconstructionists in the mode of deMan and Derrida. See
NORRIS, supra note 16, at 13.
23. A cause, Wittgenstein explains, is a hypothesis founded in experiences of reg-
ular sequential conditions. See LUDWIG WTrGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS
15-16 (3d ed. 1964). Causes are distinguishable from reasons, which are accounts
"showing a way which leads to this action." Id. at 15. "The difference between the
grammars of 'reason' and 'cause'," he continues, "is quite similar to that between the
grammars of 'motive' and 'cause'." Id. at 16. Because we use the word why to inquire
about both causes and reasons, we are confused into thinking "that a motive is a
cause of which we are immediately aware, a cause seen from the inside, or a cause
experienced." Id. In the same way, the conception that thinking "consists in operating
with signs" misleads us to conceive that "thinking is a mental activity," which in
turn misleads us into envisioning a location for it. Id. at 16-17. A thought is miscon-
ceived as something like an event located in the head. See infra notes 45-50 and
accompanying text.
24. The confusion of reasons for causes in psychoanalytic theory remains the fun-
damental mistake of many adherents and critics alike. See infra notes 93-97 and
accompanying text. Although Wittgenstein admired Freud, sometimes characterizing
himself as a disciple or follower of Freud, he was critical of Freud's assertions of
psychoanalysis as a science. See LUDWIG WITGENSTEIN, LECTURES AND CONVERSA-
TIONS 41 (Cyril Barrett ed., 1967) (compiled from notes taken by Yorick Smythies,
Rush Rhees, and James Taylor). "Freud is constantly claiming to be scientific,"
Wittgenstein remarked, "but what he gives is speculation-something prior even to
the formation of a hypothesis." Id. at 44 (notes by Rush Rhees after a conversation
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Causes explain the world in impersonal terms so that we are
able to master things. So we speak of sub-atomic electrical
charges, oxidation, biochemical deficiencies, neurotransmitters,
statistical probabilities, behavior modification, photons,
megabytes, salt corrosion, density, movement of the jet stream,
mass times the speed of light squared, blood alcohol content,
and the speed of the automobile in relation to the dimensions
of the intersection as the light was turning from yellow to red.
Reasons explain the world in personal terms so that we are
able to live in emotive equilibrium with ourselves and one an-
other. So we speak of envy, beauty, happiness, rights, obliga-
tions, faith, love, betrayal, tears that scald and start, things
that glitter but are not gold, heroes, evil, and the "reckless son-
of-a-bitch" drunk who ran the light, killed someone, and should
be locked up forever. The need for the languages of science and
literature is so much a part of us that we inevitably interweave
the grammar of causes and reasons in our never-ceasing webs
of discourse."
with Wittgenstein in 1942) (emphasis by Rhees). According to Wittgenstein, Freud's
failure to make the basic distinction between causes and reasons had made for an
"abominable mess" among psychoanalytic theorists. See JACQUES BOUVERESSE,
WITTGENSTEIN READS FREUD 69 (Carol Cosman trans., 1995) (quoting G.E. Moore,
Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 316 (1959)). Bouveresse
comments:
For event A to be considered the cause of event B, one would have
to verify that in a sufficient number of cases events of the A variety are
followed by events of the B variety. Of course, an event of the first type
could still happen without being followed by an event of the second type.
The relation of causation (Verursachung) is therefore hypothetical in a
sense that the relation between a reason and the action it explains
(Begrundung) is not. A reason is characterized by the capacity to be
recognized as such by the person whose reason it is, and not on the
basis of an inductive inference. Yet Freud either formulates causal hy-
potheses, and in this case he must try and verify them by methods dif-
ferent from his own; or he proposes and imposes reasons, and the accep-
tance of a reason has nothing to do with the acceptance of an explana-
tory hypothesis of the causal type, or for that matter with any hypothe-
sis at all.
Id. at 69-70.
25. Daniel Dennett illustrates the interweaving through causal hybrids as asser-
tions that employ intentional idioms in a grammatical structure by which they are
"subject to the usual rules of evidence for causal assertions." DENNETr, supra note 6,
at 235. Dennett writes:
1. His belief that the gun was loaded caused his heart attack.
2. His obsessive desire for revenge caused his ulcers.
3. The thought of his narrow escape from the rattler made him shudder.
116
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The ability to impose a cause in the scientific mode is often
useful in articulating a reason in the literary mode, but each
mode entails its own peculiar criteria. Appealing to the princi-
ple of gravitational force is useful in understanding how a per-
son who jumped from a bridge committed suicide. It is, howev-
er, of small use in understanding why. Yet the grammatical
similarities of the questions and the usefulness of the methodol-
ogy which yields the cause automatically graft the why into a
causal dialect. Hence, the why of the suicide appears to be a
question which is, at least in principle, subject to scientific
verification. The true answer would not lie in the fact that the
deceased's heart was broken, that he was betrayed by his best
friend, that he could not suffer the searing anguish of a debili-
tating illness, or that he looked upon a sea of endless suffering
and the darkness prevailed. Because these are all intentional
explanations or reasons, we are comfortable acknowledging that
no one of these is the real one. The mistake is to think that
because none of these is real, a real answer or a scientific cause
must still exist and can be found if the intentional factors are
translated into a clinical etiology of chemical imbalances and
misfiring neuronal impulses. To some persons, this type of
explanation would seem the truth of the matter. The cause and
the reason would appear as one and the same. But such per-
sons could never have loved the deceased, looked into his eyes,
laughed with him, shared his meals, or talked to him as a
friend. To say that causes and reasons are the same is simply
4. He threw himself to the floor because of his belief that the gun was loaded.
5. His obsessive desire for revenge led him to follow Jones all the way to Bur-
ma.
6. He refused to pick up the snake because at that moment he thought of his
narrow escape from the rattler.
Id. at 235-36. The first three examples, as Dennett notes, invoke intentional explana-
tions while not strictly attributing these as causes of the event. The next three exam-
ples provide the desires, beliefs, and thoughts as direct causes of the event. In either
type of statement, the explanations influence the reader to understand the event "by
making it reasonable in the light of certain beliefs, intentions, desires ascribed to the
agent." Id. at 236. Bouveresse considers Dennett's examples and concludes that
Wittgenstein's grammar of causes and reasons would not preclude a reason in the
form of an intentional explanation from being a cause, but such a reason would in-
variably be more than a cause. See BOUVERESSE, supra note 24, at 74-77. A reason
would always be a kind of interpretation, endowing an action with meaning. See id.
at 78 (analogizing Wittgenstein's distinction between causes and reasons to Friedrich
Waismann's distinction between causes and motives).
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to speak of a context where reasons are not necessary because
the emotive connection to the subject is marginal.
III. SELF, SIN, AND STATE OF MIND
Perhaps no human task is so naturally prone to tangle the
respective human needs for causes and reasons than the
attempt to attribute responsibility. Responsibility appears to be
a kind of reason insofar as it makes sense of a situation of con-
flict, and it appears to be a kind of cause insofar as it imposes
a relation such that person A precedes event X. The causality
attributed is not a cause in the strict sense, however, tangen-
tially it might employ scientific induction. To say that person A
precedes event X in a manner that makes him responsible for
the event is to choose person A from a complex of precedent
factors and endow person A with a peculiar significance apart
from any scientific induction. For example, from a scientific
stance, the internal bleeding was as much a cause of person B's
death as was the steel fragment that tore the artery, person A
who failed to maneuver his car, the manufacturer who made
B's car without an air bag, or person B herself for being in the
wrong place at the wrong time. If, however, we say that any of
these is responsible for the death, we are left unsatisfied
because the term "responsible" in this context, designating
scientific causality, does not make sense of the situation in the
same way as saying that person A is responsible. If we do
conclude that a design defect or some other nonhuman prece-
dent factor was responsible, it is tantamount to saying that we
identify emotively with person A to such a degree that it would
make less sense, not more, to designate his role with a peculiar
emphasis.26
26. In the words of Felix Cohen, "[w]hat we actually do when we look for a legal
cause is to pick out of this infinity of intersecting strands a useful point at which
public pressure can be placed." Cohen, supra note 20, at 252; cf Guido Calabresi,
Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, 43 U. Cmi. L. REV. 69, 106 (1975-1976) (re-
marking that for legal purposes, the term cause is used "always to identify those
pressure points that are most amenable to the social goals we wish to accomplish").
Although H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honor6 do not dispute this "pragmatic" view of cau-
sality, they comment that it has "no plausibility as an account of what lawyers mean
by causation," and that it could lead to "very strange results," for example, that an
intentional tortfeasor would not be liable to compensate his victim if liability did not
appear to provide an effective deterrent. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORI, CAUSATION IN
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So "responsibility" as the term is used in common discourse,
can designate either a cause or a reason, but strictly speaking,
a judgment of responsibility always entails both. Because of the
loose terminology, we think of a reason being nothing more
than a cause "seen from the inside." 7 This fundamental
misperception lies at the root of subsequent confusion about the
capacity of scientific testimony to establish whether the defen-
dant "labored under melancholy distempers"" or "knew the
nature and quality of his act."29 In both examples, reasons are
THE LAW 300-01 (2d ed. 1996). To read Calibresi's "pressure points" or Cohen's "use-
ful public pressure" as referring to a more general sense of justice (i.e., encompassing
more than economics) is unsound, they argue, because it imputes the ordinary use of
the word cause, and this implies that causes are actions that themselves designate
responsibility as opposed to human ascriptions that designate responsibility by char-
acterizing an action as a cause. See id. at 301. In other words, the "ordinary" under-
standing of the word cause is logical insofar as cause is assigned a fixed meaning
distinct from responsibility, but this distinction remains an artifice of the
judge/speaker rather than an actual function of language and perception. See supra
notes 23, 24, where characterizations of behavior bestow causation as much as causa-
tion bestows blame. See also Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence
Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 550-51 (1962) ("[ft is defendant's conduct that inflicts
the hurt, but it is the law that makes his conduct negligent. Negligence must be
based on causal relation, but causal relation can never be based on negligence in the
air.").
27. See supra note 23.
28. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL CULPABILITY 8 (1995) (quoting
Sir Matthew Hale, ca. 1635, quoted in 1 N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENG-
LAND 41 (1968)). This formulation is an attempt to refine in seventeenth-century
medical terminology the earlier tests analogizing the accused's disposition to a "wild
beast." Id. As one scholar comments,
The analogy to the wild beast as a test has 3 important charac-
teristics: first, beasts, as distinguished from human beings, were consid-
ered incapable of reason; second, the wild beast was thought to lack any
control over its behavior; and third, the wild beast was seen as totally
emotionally deranged-in a 'Trenzy". (a term frequently employed in early
psychiatric literature).. . . The analogy is reflected in another phrase of
the early law and psychiatry statutes: the "furiously insane."
Alan A. Stone, Psychiatry and the Law,'in THE NEW HARVARD GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRY
797, 803 (Armand A. Nicholi, Jr., M.D. ed., 1988).
29. SLOVENKO, supra note 28, at 17-22 (explaining the origin and history of the
M'Naghten rule). The test, originally formulated by Lord Chief Justice Nicholas Tindal
in 1843 in response to criticism over the acquittal of the would-be assassin of the
British Prime Minister, took the following form:
[E]very man is presumed to be sane, and . . . to establish a defense on
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a de-
fect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not
know that he was doing what was wrong.
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treated as causes; in other words, they are treated as facts to
be measured or established. The same error engenders ques-
tions, such as whether the defendant's act was the result of an
"irresistible impulse"" or the "product of a mental disease or
defect."31 It underlies the question of whether the accused
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 722 (H.L. 1843).
30. See SLOVENKO, supra note 28, at 24-25. The irresistible and uncontrollable
impulse test was formulated by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw in Commonwealth v.
Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844). The following adaptation, preserving the
classic form of the test, is from Parsons v. State:
[Did [the accused] know right from wrong, as applied to the particular
act in question? ... If he did have such knowledge, he may nevertheless
not be legally responsible if the two following conditions concur: (1) If, by
reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost the power
to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in
question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed; (2) and if, at
the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental
disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product
of it solely.
Parsons v. State, 72 So. 854, 866-67 (Ala. 1887).
31. First enunciated by Judge David Bazelon in Durham v. United States, the
Durham test, is as follows:
[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect .... We use "disease" in the
sense of a condition which is considered capable or either improving or
deteriorating. We use "defect" in the sense of a condition which is not
eonsidered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be
either congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physi-
cal or mental disease.
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
The District of Columbia Circuit modified the so-called Durham test. See Mc-
Donald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding that neither
courts nor juries were bound to find a mental disease or defect, even if expert
psychiatrics impose clinical categories indicating disease or defect). The court then
overruled Durham in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(adopting the ALI rule as stated in the Model Penal Code). Initially, a proponent of
the rule, Karl Menninger announced that the Durham decision was "more revolution-
ary" than Brown v. Board of Education. According to Slovenko, who cites personal
correspondence, Menninger eventually became "embarrassed by his statement . . . and
did not like to be reminded of it." SLOVENKO, supra note 28, at 23. Menninger's intel-
lectual prowess and emotive sensitivity made him a brilliant psychoanalyst. These
same qualities engendered a kind of anguish at the impossibility of distinguishing
causes and reasons in a scientific sense-i.e., in merging the contradictory needs of
both understanding evil and punishing it. See KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUN-
ISHMENT 190-218 (1966) (denouncing as primitive the Kantian sensibility that behav-
ior is subject to transcendental categorical judgment). He later embraced the concept
of "sin" as the most appropriate device for understanding the inherent conflicts of hu-
man thought and action. See KARL MENNINGER, WHATEVER BECAME OF SIN?. (1973).
One way of viewing this evolution is that Menninger's medical paradigm gradually at-
tained the flexibility of a "language game" in Wittgenstein's sense, implicitly acknowl-
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"lack[ed] substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminali-
ty [wrongfilness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law."32 These questions appear to in-
quire about matters of fact that are scientifically verifiable;3
the appearance results from the failure to acknowledge a differ-
ence in the kind of psychological needs that impel us to ask the
questions.34
Because both causes and reasons attribute responsibility, the
disentangling of grammar compels a distinction between differ-
ent modes of responsibility. The scientific language of causes
attributes object-responsibility,5 addressing a context of verifi-
edging the psychological need to appeal to a "meaning" or "sense" of life beyond lin-
guistic formulation. See infra note 55.
32. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
33. The ALI test has been justified on the ground that it circumvents the prob-
lem of false scientific categories by recognizing that mental illness affects an entire
personality, not simply cognition (M'Naghten) or volition (irresistible impulse). The
ALI test allows the jury to recognize that how "substantial" the impairment must be
in order to exonerate a defendant is not strictly a matter of medical science, but is a
matter of community standards that the jury can ascertain. See State v. Johnson, 399
A.2d 469, 477 (R.I. 1979). The resolution is illusory, however, to the degree expert
testimony is extended from a strict insanity defense to one of diminished capacity, in
other words, from a determination of whether a defendant possesses the minimum
rationality to be treated as human to a determination of whether the defendant's acts
were rational in light of determinable psychological facts, the effect of which precludes
a mens rea. In the strict insanity defense, scientific categorizations are of doubtful
consequence; whether the expert testimony is framed in terms of cognition, volition,
product, or capacity, the bottom line determination of minimum rationality will re-
main holistic because juries do not think solely in the categories presented by ex-
perts. See Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors
Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64
(1995). With respect to a determination of substantial capacity, it is doubtful that
jurors preserve in any functional manner the distinction between the legal question of
a defendant's responsibility and the medical question of his mental state. But even if
this were so, the distinction seems academic by virtue of the fact that jurors actually
faced with the task of imposing punishment invariably act inconsistently with the
community standards to which they ascribe. See WILSON, supra note 3, at 90. For a
survey of the various tests of criminal responsibility currently adopted' in state courts,
see Michelle Migdal Gee, Annotation, Modern Status of Test of Criminal Responsi-
bility-State Cases, 9 A.L.R.4TH 526 (1981).
34. That is, the need to understand the world by imposing fixed meanings, and
the need to experience a sense to life which is undermined by the fixed quality of
meanings.
35. The distinction between object- and subject-responsibility is made by Meir Dan-
Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992).
Rejecting the traditional account of responsibility in terms of a free will paradigm,
Professor Dan-Cohen argues that it is more appropriate to employ a "constitutive
paradigm" according to which the self continuously is defining its boundaries in
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able events. The literary language of reasons attributes subject-
responsibility, addressing a context of emotive identification.
Object-responsibility ascribes a measurable causal relation be-
tween a person and a state of affairs. Subject-responsibility
ascribes a nonmeasurable identity between a person and a state
of affairs. For example, a person is object-responsible if she
knocks over a vase at her friend's party. The measurable act of
her elbow contacting the glass renders her the incontestable
author of the event, regardless of the fact that she did not will
it to happen. 6 The same person is subject-responsible if it is
not she but her child who knocks over the vase. 7 Although
the measurable act of begetting the child, or the act of bringing
the child to the party, establishes a remote causal chain to the
accident, it is not this basis on which responsibility is assumed.
The parent will feel responsible because of her proximate emo-
tive identification with the person of the child, whom the par-
ent perceives as a part of herself. In a similar fashion, a person
might identify with and feel responsible for her country, her
alma mater, her church, or her city's N.B.A. franchise. Subject-
responsibility is not a matter of what a person does but, rather,
of who a person is.3"
spatio-temporal and social contexts. Within ordinary responsibility statements of the
form "A is responsible for X," Dan-Cohen discerns a shift of meaning within proposi-
tions, reflecting two different, though closely related, senses of responsibility. See id.
at 962. The self perceives actions in terms of its own scalaric boundaries, and so it
may assume responsibility for an act as a part of a projected "responsibility base" or
as an "object of responsibility," depending on whether the "responsibility" relates the
act "to more central or more peripheral elements in the selfs geography." Id. at 972.
36. See id. at 962.
37. See id. at 981-82.
38. Dan-Cohen offers a hypothetical in which A shoots a gun at V and A' shoots
at V'. The bullet of A kills V. The bullet of A is diverted by a sudden wind and V'
is saved. A will be charged with murder and punished more severely than A', al-
though both appear to share an identical responsibility base-intentionally shooting at
another. Our natural tendency is to distinguish the cases as a matter of causality,
despite the fact that the broken link in the causal chain was totally fortuitous. The
more compelling distinction lies not in events external to the respective shooters, but
in their respective identities after the events:
[I]magine V's widower blaming A for the widower's devastation and ago-
ny: "You are responsible for all this suffering." If A were foolhardy
enough to inquire why, a natural answer would be, 'Because you are the
one responsible for my wife's death." The initial accusation is a matter of
object-responsibility. The second statement, made in support of the accu-
sation, is in terms of subject-responsibility; it identifies "the killing of V"
as the relevant aspect of A, by virtue of which the 'vidower's ensuing
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Who a person is cannot be reduced to measurable criteria
without contradiction because the identity sought is necessarily
predicated on feeling, and feelings are not unitary as they con-
stitute a self. The self is a complex of characteristics cast in
human terms (e.g., beliefs, thoughts, motives), which make con-
sciousness coherent to itself. An inquiry about another's self
requires an intentional stance39 that employs second-order
speculation (beliefs about beliefs) to project a modular other
necessarily cast in variations of one's own image. The resulting
model can never be verified. Yet, without the sense provided by
this intentional model, it is impossible to determine guilt in the
criminal mode. An accused's state of mind cannot be at issue as
a matter of temporal fact, but only as a complex of a
defendant's characteristics manifested over time. Moreover,
without an inquiry into an accused's state of mind, the basis of
responsibility is limited to what the person has done. This
sense of bare object-responsibility is adequate for some purpos-
es, but not for criminal punishment, which requires mens rea, a
guilty mind. Thus, the self of the person must be identified
with the criminal act in an intense mode of subject-responsibili-
misery can be rightfully placed at his doorstep.
• . . Instead of saying "You are [subject-]responsible for my wife's
death, and that is why you are [object-]responsible for my misery," the
widower could have simply retorted: "You are my wife's killer!" My point
here is that this statement can be taken quite literally as an attribution
of a certain identity or characteristic to A-that of being a killer. This
linguistic form is not at all surprising. Being a killer is in fact a recog-
nizable social role, and as such it is a candidate for participation in the
self's constitution. Because one's victim must actually die for one to "be a
killer," the fortuity of whether this happens becomes a piece of constitu-
tive luck.
. . . Both the view that V's death or survival is an external fortu-
ity that should have no bearing on our assessment or treatment of A and
the opposite intuition that the victim's actual fate heavily influences our
attitude toward A make a strong claim on our allegiance. This ambiva-
lence, however, is not just a matter of confusion or indecision. The con-
flict respects the corresponding viability of the two pictures of the subject
of responsibility that these intuitions reflectively assume. Seen in one
context and at the particular moment, V's death can be perceived as an
external event that A brought about; in a different context and time,
that same event is seen as part of A's biography, an ineluctable fact
within A's boundaries that constitutes his identity as a murderer.
Id. at 982-85.
39. See DENNETr, supra note 6, at 236-39.
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ty, which we might designate as subject-guilt.4° The guilty
state of mind becomes the pivotal issue. But is it a fact?
Even in principle, state of mind hardly seems like a verifi-
able event. It is not like a Kodak moment theoretically cap-
tured on some kind of mental film. It is more like a complex
rush of simultaneous perceptions in competition, with state of
mind being a term of art imposed retrospectively to make order
out of the chaos.4 And it is only chaos (in intentional terms)
that in principle can be verified by scientific instruments as a
biological fact of the brain. Thus, when state of mind is framed
as a question of fact appropriate to a design stance,42 employ-
ing the mechanics of scientific engineering, the language com-
bines causes and reasons so that a second-order speculation
about an accused's character, based on data ascertained over a
life span, can appear as a first-order verification of the
accused's position in a causal chain based on data purportedly
measuring a temporal event in the brain. What begins as a
kind of "category mistake,"4 ends as an empty question.
40. The term is my own. It signifies a kind of resolution to the ambivalence de-
scribed by Dan-Cohen. See supra note 38. Fortuitous elements will always bear a
causal claim to lessen our identification of the actor with the event or consequence of
his act, even when we establish identification. The attribution of a particular kind of
subjectivity, a "guilty mind," overcomes residual hesitation.
41. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 253-54 (1991). Against
the notion of a unitary consciousness in the mode of Descartes' cogito ergo sum,
Dennett accounts for biological aspects through metaphors of Multiple Drafts and
parallel pandemoniums. Analogizing human cognition to artificial intelligence, Dennett
presents the self as the brain's user illusion of itself:
There is no single, definitive "stream of consciousness," because there is
no central Headquarters, no Cartesian Theater where "it all comes to-
gether" for the perusal of a Central Meaner. Instead of such a single
stream (however wide), there are multiple channels in which specialist
circuits try, in parallel pandemoniums, to do their various things, cre-
ating Multiple Drafts as they go. Most of these fragmentary drafts of
"narrative" play short-lived roles in the modulation of current activity but
some get promoted to further functional roles, in swift succession, by the
activity of a virtual machine in the brain. The seriality of this ma-
chine . . . is not a "hard-wired" design feature, but rather the upshot of
a succession of coalitions of these specialists.
Id.
42. See DENNETT, supra note 6, at 236-37.
43. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 15-16 (1949). Gilbert Ryle coined this
term to designate inappropriate linkings of disparate concepts because of grammatical
similarities in the way we speak about them. Thus, when we say "Mr. Clinton is a
politician," and "Mr. Magoo is a cartoon," a Martian would be led to believe that
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An empty question appears to present an issue that can be
resolved empirically if one seeks hard enough for a determina-
tive fact even though one might puzzle over what the elusive
fact looks like." Are the Baltimore Ravens a continuation of
the Cleveland Browns or a new team with a number of players
who were once Cleveland Browns? However one answers this
question, one can appeal to facts in support of the answer, but
there is no hidden fact or complex of facts that will resolve the
matter. The essence of the question is metaphysical and pres-
ents an appeal to an intuitive sense of what comprises being a
team. If the definition of team were narrowed to the point
where it would admit empirical verification (for example, the
presence of a particular number of players or a certain style of
uniform), we would think that the concern of the inquirer was
not being addressed. The answer can only be given as a matter
of individual perception in light of the psychological angle from
which the team is viewed. The enhanced propriety of one angle
over another, i.e., the matter of the inquirer's concern, appears
to be a question of value or taste. There is no true or right way
of looking at the phenomenon, no invisible physical or organic
structure that can tell us whether there is one team or two. So,
it is with the state of mind. Just as there is no mental thought
film," there is no unitary true self to be photographed.46
So, when we ask about a defendant's state of mind or capaci-
ty to form the requisite criminal intent, we are not asking
about an empirical predicate inherent in a measurable object,
the defendant's mind. Rather, we are asking about the compar-
ative propriety of angles from which to view the defendant's
actions as his identity, drawing the defendant's emotional
"politicians" and "cartoons" are not different in kind, but similar predicates of similar
subjects. If one asserts that they are similar in kind, the joke works only because we
recognize the category mistake. Ryle's famous examples included mistaking Oxford
University with its constituent buildings and residential colleges, and confusing con-
sciousness as an entity not identifiable with the rest of the body. A version of the
former mistake was made by a ninth grade teacher of mine, who, reflecting on his
experiences in England during the Second World War, told the class that "Oxford"
was merely the name of a town that contained numerous colleges. The latter mistake
is illustrated by Descartes' cogito ergo sum. The phrase "ghost in the machine" origi-
nated with Ryle's attempt to discredit the mistake. See id.
44. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 40-41 (1993).
45. See DENNETr, supra note 41, at 297-320.
46. See id. at 227-52.
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boundaries in a way that makes sense to us. In other words,
while we frame the question as whether a specific mental state
was present, the question is framed more accurately as whether
we can make sense of the defendant's behavior in a particular
way." We are asking if he or she possesses the minimum level
of rationality appropriate to an intentional stance and then
employing the stance to tell ourselves what kind of person we
are dealing with.4" This is not a question of biological capacity
at a particular moment so much as one of observed characteris-
47. See Kevin L. Keeler, Comment, Direct Evidence of State of Mind: A
Philosophical Analysis of How Facts in Evidence Support Conclusions Regarding Men-
tal State, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 435, 454 (1985) (delineating Wittgenstein's view that
"intention" refers not to any single feeling or thought, but to a history of thoughts,
feelings, memories, prior acts, beliefs, and circumstances which make an act or feeling
intelligible by relating it to a socially recognized pattern of conduct). A corollary of
this insight is that a fact finder does not indirectly determine intent by looking at a
person's conduct and "guessing what was going on in the actor's mind," but rather
directly by "find[ing] amidst the various antecedents and circumstances of the act that
familiar pattern of conduct within which the act makes sense and by which it can be
explained." Id. at 455. This is to say that intent, as we impose the label upon our-
selves and others, is a reason retrospectively synthesized from Dennett's multiple
streams of consciousness, rather than a cause spontaneously emanating from a Cen-
tral Meaner. See DENNETT, supra note 41. In other words, a particular intent does
not exist in the moment one seeks to explain; it exists as a shorthand designation of
various elements subsequently employed to explain the moment.
48. For a survey of Dennett's and others' theories and speculation on their effect
on criminal accountability, see Andrew E. Lelling, Comment, Eliminative Materialism,
Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471 (1993). Lelling appears
critical of Dennett for not following his own theories to their logical conclusion-i.e.,
the elimination of folk psychology from the criminal law. See id. at 1527. Dennett
establishes the invalidity of our everyday understanding of consciousness by means of
his multiple drafts model, yet he maintains the fictions of an intentional system of
beliefs, desires, intentions, and others allowing for a change of stances when the
actor's behavior appears so irrational that it cannot be explained via an intentional
stance. See DENNETT, supra note 41, at 101-38. Dennett employs a design stance to
understand actions operating within a non-rational system (a stance more appropriate
to behaviorists or psychodynamic analysts), and a physical stance to understand ac-
tions as consequences of drugs or other neuro-chemical reactions (a stance more ap-
propriate to biological psychiatry). See id. In either event, Lelling, citing Michael
Moore, cannot, in principle, accept what Dennett concedes as a necessary fiction. See
Lelling, supra, at 1528-30. The problem with Lelling's hard scientific line, which he
acknowledges contains gaps that presently must be filled with intentional bridges, see
id. at 1534-35, is that it does not allow the language of reason its own integrity. He
appears to presume that causes and reasons are one and the same, or that reasons
are necessarily inferior speculations that fill the gaps between causes. See id. at
1560-61 (endorsing Rebecca Dresser's hypothetical murder trial, employing a
mentalometer to retrieve data from the defendant's brain in order to scientifically
determine the nature of her culpability); see also Rebecca Dresser, Culpability and
Other Minds, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 44, 70-71 (1993).
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tics in a larger temporal context-i.e., how much of ourselves
we proximately identify in the defendant whom we perceive
from multiple aspects. Like the question about the Ravens and
the Browns, the question about the defendant's state of mind
appears to inquire about an empirical fact but more accurately
sets the condition of a value judgment. If state of mind or per-
son were defined narrowly enough to admit empirical verifica-
tion, we would be asking a question about biological functions.
Although this question could be answered, we would not be
compelled to ask it in the first place because biological func-
tions are only marginally useful in establishing reasons.4" We
need reasons to attribute subject-guilt and punish a person.
Causes are not enough."
49. Cf. Oliver R. Goodenough, Biology, Behavior, and Criminal Law: Seeking a
Responsible Approach to an Inevitable Interchange, 22 VT. L. REV. 263 (1997);
Maureen P. Coffey, Note, The Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 353 (1993); Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Crimi-
nal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Rule? 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1988).
50. A similar paradigm can be applied to civil litigation, where reasons are re-
quired for the imposition of liability, notwithstanding rhetorical formulations which
cast reasons as causes. The concept of proximate cause in tort law is inherently val-
ue-driven in the sense that it stops an otherwise infinite causal regression at a place
locating responsibility in the comparatively less sympathetic actor. See supra note 26.
There is data suggesting that a jury might well predicate responsibility on a remote
and fortuitous act if the story is told in the right way. Cf Feigenson, supra note 33,
at 117-18. For example, but for the plaintiff getting out of bed in the morning, he
would not have been at the intersection where the defendant ran the light. See id.
To illustrate the simulation heuristic by which jurors construct alternate sce-
narios to identify the deviant event that caused an accident, Professor Feigenson cites
an experiment in which subjects read two different accounts of a victim killed on his
way home from work by a drunken teenager running a red light. See id. at 117-19.
In one version, the victim left the office at an unusual time, but took his usual
route. In the other version, the victim took an unusual route but left at the ordinary
time. When asked to imagine how the victim's family would complete the thought, "If
only _, [the accident would not have happened]," the answers most often corre-
sponded to the incident that had been identified as unusual in the story, the time for
those reading the first version and the route for those reading the second. Neither
group tended to identify any of the teenager's acts as the "if only' factor." See id.
The recent debate over the liability of manufacturers of silicone breast implants
illustrates the primacy of reasons in attributions of civil liability. The primary conflict
is not, as it is usually cast, the presence or absence of "scientific" evidence establish-
ing causal.harm. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Expo-
sure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1995). Rather, the controversy is better
understood as a clash of identities, with both litigation factions unable to draw their
emotional boundaries to encompass the harm and engender subject-responsibility.
To the woman afflicted with illness, the implantation clearly stands out as the
deviant event in the simulation heuristic of a healthy life. To the degree that breast
implants are themselves a product of perverse cultural pressures, they can only be
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The philosopher Albert Jonsen has analyzed the problem of
moral attribution, and he has distinguished a pattern of attri-
bution that -essentially corresponds to our identifications of
Wittgenstein's causes, Dan-Cohen's object-responsibility, and
Dennett's design stance.5' Jonsen places in opposition to the
pattern of attribution in moral decision-making a pattern of
appropriation that essentially corresponds to our identifications
of Wittgensteins reasons, Dan-Cohen's subject-responsibility,
and Dennett's intentional stance.2 One of Jonsen's conclusions
elucidates the basic dilemma of separating the two realms, and
why the two languages are inseparable if we are to overcome
our paralysis between disdain and empathy for the one to
whom we attribute subject-guilt:
In the pattern of attribution, the judge's question about
the propriety of praise and blame takes him into the issues
of intention, motivation, deliberation, and character. In the
pattern of appropriation, the agent's question about the
development of self-possession takes him into the issues of
consideration, conscientiousness and commitment. But it is
clear that the question and notions of attribution rest in
some manner on the question and notions of appropriation.
While the judge's question looks principally for external
evidence of moral causality and need not strike so deeply
into the interior of moral agency, the moral agent must
exist for the judge's question to have ultimate meaning.
Praising and blaming must somehow reflect and contribute
to the existence of truly moral persons. Thus, while it is
possible to separate out the considerations which are more
suited to answer the judge's question from those more suited
to the agent's, both questions finally meet.53
experienced by the woman as external to her, an invasion to which she consented as
a consequence of fraud. To the manufacturer, a simulation heuristic yields no deviant
event. Any perceived harm must then be owned by the consumer, who chose to incor-
porate the implants as part of herself. The masculine quality of the appeal to scien-
tific causality, see infra notes 108-09, no doubt aggravates the impossibility of em-
pathic understanding on both sides. For an insightful overview of breast implant
litigation, including an account of media-driven attitudes and causal perceptions, see
Julie M. Spanbauer, Breast Implants as Beauty Ritual: Woman's Sceptre and Prison,
9 YALE J.L. & FEMINSM 157, 163-71 (1997).
51. See ALBERT R. JONSEN, RESPONSIBILITY IN MODERN RELIGIOUS ETHIcS 37-60
(1968).
52. See id. at 60-70.
53. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
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Questions framed in such terms as a defendant's intent,
mens rea, premeditation, or capacity to distinguish right from
wrong are directed not so much to an objective pattern of verifi-
able attributes as to a subjective pattern of appropriating a
person's very humanity. The judgment of a pattern of a
defendant's humanity can be made only by reflection of the
judge's own pattern of events. Thus, if we look upon a contextu-
al scene and fail to see in the accused a resemblance to our-
selves that is sufficient to compel us to adopt an intentional
stance, the one we judge is not really a person, and the respon-
sibility we attribute is of the object mode. We perceive the
accused as something like a machine whose workings have been
appropriated by sickness, or we see an animal living according
to animal instinct.
A machine or an animal can be object-responsible in the
sense of setting in motion a causal chain. We blame machines
and animals for bad consequences, but the emotive quality of
disdain is different in kind from what we feel toward another
like ourselves.54 In this sense, it is easier to attribute blame;
ironically, it is more difficult to inflict punishment. For exam-
ple, a small child, a sleepwalker, a computer, or a cat can be
guilty only as a matter of fact. A conscious adult, however,
stands guilty as a matter of identity. She is not only a link in
a causal chain, but she is the reason for the causal relation.
She is the subject of responsibility as well as an object of it.
Thus, it is a more complex matter to attribute blame, but easi-
er to inflict punishment once the culpable identity is estab-
lished.
This culpable identity, with or without God, is the manifesta-
tion of something like sin; its resolution within the human text
is as impossible as the validation of language.55 Both the judge
54. Cf Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357,
381-82 (1954) ("Why," asks the Socratic interlocutor, "doesn't the court say . . . that
it is establishing property rights on grounds of ethics or policy?" The subject re-
sponds, "I think courts generally try to make noises like slot-machines and to give
the impression that they are not legislating. People don't swear at slot-machines the
way they do at other human beings.").
55. See generally PHILIP R. SHIELDS, LOGIC AND SIN IN THE WRITINGS OF LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN (1993). Shields points out how Wittgenstein's distinction between what
can be said and what can only be shown poses a limitation that is transcendental in
a Kantian sense, manifesting both a logical and ethical demand. See id. at 11-30. The
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and the defendant are guilty in this sense of original sin."
The concept of sin "with or without God" is not nonsensical, for
the term expresses a fundamental tension between aspiration
and delimitation within the human personality. Delineating a
generic religious form, William James ascribed a certain uni-
form deliverance in which religions will appear to meet, consist-
ing of an uneasiness or the "sense that there is something
wrong about us as we naturally stand" and its solution as a
"sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper
connection with the higher powers."57 The absence of salvation
through higher powers, however, does not preclude or alleviate
a sense of wrongness." Acknowledging Kierkegaard's notion
that despair is not a fact but a state of being identifiable with
original sin, Camus, analyzing suicide, asserts that "the absurd
is sin without God."59 Just as chaos is itself a peculiar form of
order,6" on the experiential plane of consciousness ultimate
inescapable tendency of human intelligence to overstep the limitation is analogous to
St. Augustine's concept of original sin. See id. at 64; see also infra note 56.
56. Saint Augustine (354-430 C.E.) gave the concept of original sin its first articu-
late expression though antecedent versions exist in the writings of Saint Irenaeus
(ca.130-ca.200 C.E.). Taking as the scriptural basis Saint Paul's Letter to the Romans,
"[Als by the offence of one [Adam] judgment came upon all men to condemnation ...
so by the righteousness of one [Christ] the free gift came upon all men unto justifica-
tion of life." Romans 5:18 (King James). Augustine characterized the human race as a
mass of damnation. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 9, at 30-31. The freedom characteris-
tic of the human race is real in the sense that each person can choose to sin, but
none can choose not to sin. See id. at ch. 30. In other words, humans have a genuine
freedom to choose between alternatives, and every alternative is sinful with some
alternatives being more sinful than others. See 2 JUSTO L. GONZALEZ, A HISTORY OF
CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 42-44 (1971); JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE EMERGENCE OF THE CATH-
OLIC TRADITION 100-600, at 298-301 (1971). For a cogent overview of original sin,
including the antecedent doctrines and modifications subsequent to Augustine, as wel
as a bibliography, see THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 1195-97
(F.L. Cross & E.A. Livingstone eds., 3d ed. 1997). See generally infra note 70.
57. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 393-94 (1961). This
passage is quoted by SHIELDS, supra note 55, at 5-6, as expressive of Wittgenstein's
moral sensibility.
58. The impossibility of validating language from the outside posed very similar
concerns for both James and Wittgenstein. See LAWSON, supra note 11, at 22 (com-
paring the linguistic limitations imposed by both philosophers); cf JAMES, supra note
57, at 356 (asserting the inability of philosophical language to capture dimensions of
personal experience).
59. ALBERT CAMUs, The Myth of Sisyphus, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 1, 40 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1955).
60. This perception, long an inspiration to metaphysicians, see, e.g., PAUL G.
KUNTZ, COSMOS AND CHAOS: WEISS'S SYSTEMATIC CATEGORIZATION OF THE UNIVERSE
117, 118-19 (Lewis Edwin Hahn ed., 1995), has now become an inspiration to physi-
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despair is a peculiar form of religion. The sense of inherent and
incorrigible wrongness is the endemic bond of believers and
disbelievers.
Sin is, in this sense, a fact of life, though even the designa-
tion "fact" is misleading for it implies something capable of
verification on purely empirical grounds. Refuting skepticism,
G. E. Moore asserted certain fundamental propositions that
could not be doubted.6 I know, for example, that I have a
body, that I am a human being, and that the world existed long
before my birth.62 Yet Wittgenstein declared the misleading
character of asserting knowledge with regard to any of these
things:
If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a
body I should take him to be a half-wit. But I shouldn't
know what it would mean to try to convince him that he
had one. And if I had said something, and that had re-
moved his doubt, I should not know how or why.63
Certain matters are so basic that we cannot "know" them be-
cause knowing assumes a means of verification and a reason to
doubt," neither of which sensibly can be predicated on these
matters. What at first blush appears to be empirical knowledge
is something more foundational, something without which we
cannot live or think at all.65 To deny it is not to be wrong, but
to be crazy and perhaps sinful. 6 For example, to learn of the
cists under the rubric of chaos theory. See generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS (1987).
61. See RAY MONK, LUDWIG WrITGENsTEIN 556-57 (1990) (giving accounts of
Moore's propositions and Wittgenstein's responses).
62. See id.
63. SHIELDS, supra note 55, at 17 (citing WITrGENsTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 257
(G.E.M. Anscombe & 5 G.H. vonWright eds., & Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1969)).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 18.
66. Cf. MENNINGER, WHATEVER BECAME OF SIN?, supra note 31, at 46. Dr.
Menninger explains that in the wake of numerous psychological theories accounting
for behavior previously regarded as sinful, some persons came to see the concept as
trite. See id. Nevertheless,
[S]in became for believers and nonbelievers alike a far more dignified
concept . . . The latter, those of serious and intelligent make-up, are just
as concerned as believers with the errors of mankind, and its present in-
creasingly dismal situation. They may talk in terms of immorality and
ethics and of antisocial behavior instead of sin, because it absolves them
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Nazi Holocaust is to know something. To deny that it happened
is wrong because it is a matter the veracity of which is af-
firmed by empirical data. To affirm that the Holocaust took
place and yet deny that it is properly the subject of outrage is
not wrong, it is crazy. One who holds that belief cannot be
accommodated within human conversation any more than one
who denies her own existence. Such people undermine the
grammar of human sensibility in a radical way, precluding
empathic identification and rational communication. In other
words, try as we might, we cannot adopt an intentional stance
toward these people.
The same experiential grammar impels qualitative judgments
of craziness regarding the extent to which the person's act is
not only crazy but sinful. We instinctively pity the person who
denies her own existence and instinctively abhor the person
who denies the outrageousness of the Nazis. This is not a mat-
ter of moral knowledge. It is simply who we are. In both cases,
an intentional stance is possible in some measure because rea-
sons can be posited to explain why each person is incapable of
full personhood. Beyond this, however, reasons appear to fail,
and causes are beside the point. It is scientific causal nonsense
to say that we both pity and abhor the schizophrenic mother
who drowns her baby because she, unlike the Nazi, whom we
simply abhor, does not choose qualitatively her state of mind.
The concept of choice implies a consciousness that is not biolog-
ically determined. The concentration camp commandant pos-
from acknowledging a God to be sinning against. This is a distinction
without a difference in my opinion. It is just as presumptuous to "know"
God as to deny His existence....
I believe there is "sin" which is expressed in ways which cannot be
subsumed under verbal artifacts such as "crime," "disease," "delinquency,"
"deviancy." There is immorality; there is unethical behavior; there is
wrongdoing. And I hope to show there is usefulness in retaining the
concept, and indeed the word, SIN, which now shows some signs of re-
turning to public acceptance. I would like to help this trend along.
Id.
The statement that it is as presumptuous to deny God's existence as to know
it, the reference to the usefulness of the concept of sin, and that there is a linguistic
dimension of the problem, are reminiscent of William James. See id. at 146. The
implication that sin has an essential connection to the human inability to speak of
things that are simply manifest is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's notion that sin is




sesses no peculiar immunity from genetic, neurochemical, and
behavioral influences. Does it then make sense to hospitalize
the mother and hang the commandant? If the schizophrenic
kills in madness she is, nevertheless, subject-responsible, for
even her fragmented identity must incorporate the role of killer,
but she is not subject-guilty.67
The attribution of craziness and pity to the schizophrenic
allows us to separate the sin from the sinner. In some sense
she was not herself, not human, when she committed evil.
Thus, her subject-responsibility engenders a subject-guilt less
intensive than in the other case. The attribution of craziness
and abhorrence to the war criminal engenders a powerful sense
of subject-guilt precluding separating the sin and the sinner.68
Although this qualitative gradation of subject-guilt cannot be
verified or measured scientifically, it does make sense, and
qualitative distinctions retain sense along a vast continuum of
craziness in various manifestations.69
After accounting for the biological-environmental-causal mech-
anisms of schizophrenia, we cannot enter the form of life which
is her delusional self. Indeed, this is why we designate it as
delusional. After accounting for the biological-environmental-
causal mechanisms of Nazism, we still have some access to the
criminal consciousness, for it is our own seen manifest from a
varied angle. The distinction might be characterized as a mat-
ter of retaining an intentional stance toward the Nazi, while
adopting a purer design stance toward the schizophrenic, or it
might be characterized as adopting qualitatively different ver-
sions of intentional or design stances toward both.7 ° The char-
67. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
69. The partial responsibility variant of diminished capacity is, thus, a more use-
ful fiction than the mens rea variant in that the former allows a more encompassing
concept of mind. It is only by a severe circumscription of mens that one can char-
acterize the schizophrenic who drowns her child and the professional hit man as
possessing the same mens rea. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 1, at 30. Both acted with
volition. But the volition is qualitatively different if it is viewed from multiple as-
pects. In addition, the meaning of volition is itself susceptible to different aspects. See
infra notes 99, 101 and accompanying text (regarding the meaning of "punishment").
70. From a Freudian angle, because we can identify with the Nazi criminal in a
way that we cannot identify with the schizophrenic mother, the Nazi is subject to a
greater degree of our own projected self hatred, and this compels punishment. See
SIGMUND FREUD, BEYoND THE PLEASURE PRINcIPLE 33 (James Strachey trans., 1961);
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acterization of the distinction, however, does not matter.'
What does matter is the realization that the distinction is not
validly predicated on different degrees of freedom or different
mental processes at any precise moment. These questions are
as empty of verification as the question whether the Baltimore
SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 68-69 (James Strachey trans.,
1961). However paradoxical it may seem, we simultaneously cannot believe that a
human person could behave as a concentration camp torturer while, at the same
time, we know unconsciously at least, that each of us is a torturer in his own heart.
While this fact can be consciously denied, it cannot escape manifestation in uncon-
scious dynamics such as projection. Freud writes,
[A] particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations
which produce too great an increase of unpleasure: there is a tendency to
treat them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the
outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli
into operation as a means of defense against them. This is the origin of
projection ....
FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE, supra, at 33. Within the human psyche
there is much unpleasure to project:
[Mien are not gentle creatures who want to be loved . . . they are, on
the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be
reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour
is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone
who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his
capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his
consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to
torture and kill him .... In circumstances that are favourable to it,
when the mental counter-forces which ordinarily inhibit it are out of
action, [aggressiveness] ... manifests itself spontaneously and reveals
man as a savage beast to whom consideration towards his own kind is
something alien.
FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra, at 68-69. We stand ready to grant
mercy to the schizophrenic because we do not really know what it is like to be
schizophrenic. We stand ready to condemn the Nazi because we do know what it is
like to be him. For cogent explanations of projection, repression, reaction formations,
and other unconscious dynamics, see David S. Caudill, Freud and Critical Legal Stud-
ies: Contours of a Radical Socio-Legal Psychoanalysis, 66 IND. L.J. 651, 657-60 (1991).
For a discussion of instinctive human aggression in tension with the ideals of com-
munity, including the concept of original patricide upon which Freud predicated a
version of original sin and the subsequent institutionalization of guilt and renuncia-
tion via the rule of law, see Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions:
Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 817,
822-38 (1986).
71. Note again the paradox of dehumanization. The attribution of subject-guilt
presupposes the dominance of an intentional stance by which we personally identify
with the evil manifest in the accused. A design stance, while dehumanizing the ac-
cused, makes personal identification difficult. We do not punish machines with the fe-
rocity we impose on humans. See supra notes 6, 54. This is not to say that ferocity
cannot be an appropriate response to certain criminals. It is to say that a just person
will strive to discern the degree to which our own self-hatred is a motive to punish.
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Ravens comprise the same or a different team than the Cleve-
land Browns. It is not a matter of causation, but a matter of
looking at the world in a certain way.72 The way we look at
things is a matter something like Jonsen's patterns of appropri-
ation or Wittgenstein's forms of life.7"
If the questions toward which most of forensic psychology are
directed are scientifically empty, another question arises: is
there a legitimate function of expert psychiatric testimony in
criminal cases? Of course there is, but the proffered information
is viewed better not in the mode of causes and patterns of at-
tribution, but in the mode of reasons and patterns of appropria-
tion. Determining the degree rather than the existence of sub-
ject-guilt is the goal. If this determination is not to be empty, it
must not entail the illusion that freedom, will, volition, or state
of mind are scientific facts to be discovered but, rather, they
are terms of approval or disdain to be ascribed in just measure.
The measure of justice is not scientific, but this does not render
it meaningless or dysfimctionally subjective. Justice is not a
concept, a scheme, or a theory. Justice is a sensibility manifest
in acts performed by individual men and women. We do not
know that justice is done any more than we know that we have
bodies, ancestors, or feelings. Justice is a part of us which we
can neither verify nor doubt. Its content is given by that which
stands fast around it. Its manifestation carries the impression
of running up against the limits of what language can express
and connecting with a higher power that renders expression
unnecessary. It is not scientific. It simply is.
IV. INSIGHT AND IMMODEST PROPOSALS
If the operative question is not properly characterized as one
of fact, but rather of value, expert testimony is not properly di-
72. Cf Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE L.J. 1, 55 (1984) ("What protects us against Nazism is not the belief that
reason can prove that it is wrong. What protects us is outrage.").
73. See supra notes 21-23, 51-53 and accompanying texts; see also SHIELDS, supra
note 55, at 16-19 (explaining Wittgenstein's idea that language does not "mirror"
reality, but that all human language becomes meaningful by "what stands fast
around it," i.e., by other words and by a "form of life" of the speaker that gives his
own self definition).
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rected to the designated finder of fact. For this reason, mens
rea, or any variation of a specific intent or state of mind,
should not be characterized as an element of a crime, but rath-
er as a marker of the quality of criminal responsibility already
conceded.74 The elements of the crime (the facts to be found)
should concern only the attribution of object-responsibility by
causal relations. This is ordinarily an uncomplicated matter,
resting upon the presence or absence of empirically verifiable
evidence. In contrast, reconstructing the defendant's mental
state is ordinarily a complex matter, involving perceptions of
the defendant's defining forms of life and the context of her
personal experiences and beliefs as best we can imagine them
by empathic reference. The operative facts of this determination
are not found in the manner of objects and causal relations so
much as they are drawn in light of the experiences and be-
liefs-the forms of life-of the observer. It is, then, a kind of
moral judgment with far-reaching implications. Therefore, we
should use greater care in assigning the task of reconstructing
the defendant's mental state than in assigning the finding of
facts.
Bifurcation of trials into two stages, one determining factual
guilt and the other determining mental capacity, has been ad-
vocated before,75 and it has authoritatively been declared a
74. Diminished capacity, thus, assumes the partial responsibility criticized by Pro-
fessor Morse. See Morse, supra note 1, at 28-36.
75. Karl Menninger took this position in MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT,
supra note 31, at 138-42, praising Sheldon Glueck for having taken the same position
as early as 1936. See SHELDON GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR EN-
TENTE CoRDIALE? 145 (1962). In an imaginary conversation between a trial judge and
a psychiatrist, Menninger's psychiatrist concludes as follows:
In my opinion, what you should do, what all courts should do, what
society should do, is to exclude all psychiatrists from the courtroom! ...
After you have tried the case, let us doctors and our assistants examine
him and confer together outside the courtroom and render a report to
you, which will express our view of the offender-his potentialities, his
liabilities, and possible remedies.
MENNINGER, supra, at 138. Menninger did not envision widespread disagreement
among examining psychiatrists. Nevertheless, the modern proliferation of abuse excus-
es and other questionable theories only makes it more sensible to remove the diag-
nostic muddle from the jury's realm of fact. Menninger agreed that psychiatrists
should not raise the ultimate legal issues of sanity and responsibility, but should "say
in simple English why we think this man has acted in this way so different from the
rest of us," and what might be done to change him. Id. "You [the judge] will then
decide if we have been persuasive, and make possible by order what you think is the
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failure. 6 The reason for its failure is nothing more than a
slightly disguised incarnation of the same category mistake that
bifurcation attempts to rectify, the mistake of conceiving of
state of mind as an empirical judgment that indicates responsi-
bility by discovering it rather than as a moral judgment that
creates responsibility by attributing it. Courts have invalidated
bifurcation models on the constitutional ground that expert
psychological testimony cannot be excluded from a trial deter-
mining guilt if the testimony is relevant to the question of
mens rea." According to the American Bar Association com-
mentary on Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, this
reasoning tends to undermine the purpose of bifurcation by
needlessly presenting the same evidence at two separate
phases. 8 This is true. The premise, however, that mens rea is
an essential element of a crime fails to account for any possible
distinction between object- and subject-responsibility, design-
and intentional-stances, patterns of attribution and patterns of
appropriation, or causes and reasons. We might thus say of
bifurcated trials what Chesterton said of Christianity, that it is
not an ideal that has been tried and found wanting, but rather
one that has been found difficult and left untried. 9
most promising recommendation." Id. In other words, the psychiatrist will offer rea-
sons for the defendant's behavior, and the judge will make the moral determination
of the defendant's subject-responsibility. This does not mean that judges would be
unaccountable for their actions; if the judges are themselves just persons, they will
not fear accountability, and they will take care to explain their decisions.
76. See Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How
Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505, 518-30 (1995)
(criticizing bifurcation and severance in criminal cases as "burdensome and expensive
remedies" that often can be accomplished by stipulations); Verla Seetin Neslund, Com-
ment, The Bifurcated Trial: Is it Used More than it is Useful?, 31 EMORY L.J. 441
(1982) (concluding that bifurcation is necessary only in a few criminal insanity cases,
and the proper solution is to vest discretion in trial courts); infra notes 77-78.
77. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 471 P.2d 715 (Ariz. 1970); State ex rel. Boyd v.
Green, 355 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1978); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977). For
cogent discussions of these cases, see Neslund, supra note 76, at 475-82. A host of
other courts have held that due process does not require bifurcation. See Debra T.
Landis, Annotation, Necessity or Propriety of Bifurcated Criminal Trial on Issue of
Insanity Defense, 1 A.L.R.4TH 884, 891-94 (1980).
78. See RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 559 (2d ed. 1990) (quoting CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS,
Standard 7-6.7 commentary at 341 (1987)).
79. See GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE WORLD 48 (1910).
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If it is presently impossible for courts and legislatures to
eradicate the concept of mens rea as an element of an offense,
the concept, nevertheless, can be circumscribed in a manner
that reduces the confusion of causes and reasons. Professor
Wilson has proposed this as a remedy to the complex associa-
tions jurors face when they are instructed to find or not find
such mental facts as malice and premeditation: °
Apart from well-recognized justifications (such as self-
defense or law enforcement) and excuses (such as necessity
or insanity), all homicides [should] be clearly subject to sim-
ple tests: Was it intended? If intended, was the killer un-
reasonably provoked? If not intended, was the killing the
result of actions that a reasonable person would know were
risky?81
A preferable way of stating the criteria for questions properly
submitted to a jury would be to indicate whether the issue
submitted is capable of verification by direct reference to physi-
cal data. A defendant might be permitted to testify directly
about her own feelings, her fear, hate, anxiety, but nothing
more, and no second order testimony, including that of experts,
would be allowed. If it is evident from first-order testimony that
a defendant is crazy, she could fit within the traditional excep-
tion of insanity assuming the defense is preserved along with
the concept of mens rea, and the judge would be limited in
sentencing options at the second stage. It should be noted that
these are limitations that a good judge would impose in the
more enlightened bifurcation model because any preliminary
finding of factual guilt (object responsibility) would empower
the judge to consider a very broad range of evidence going to
the value judgment regarding state of mind (subject responsibil-
ity). A cryptically crazy defendant will be found out at the sec-
ond stage, if not at the first.
Even if the concept of mens rea is narrowed in the manner
suggested, the concept still poses a comparatively high risk of
confusing jurors. It would be far better to overcome the atavis-
tic rhetorical habit of miscasting states of mind as facts and to
80. See WILSON, supra note 3, at 102-03.
81. Id. at 103.
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abandon the mens rea fiction altogether. Volition should remain
a prerequisite for punishment. If, however, lack of volition is
not obvious from the bare facts, it is not properly characterized
as a factual question82 and should be left to the judge. This
procedure entails a public abandonment of additional fictions
enmeshed in accepted legal rhetoric: that judges simply follow
the law in most instances, and make the law with judgments
having moral or political significance only in the few instances
where legislatures and higher courts have not spoken. Although
this autonomic view of the judiciary has been thoroughly de-
bunked by law professors in the past century, it remains a
common trope of politicians who criticize judges for making
instead of applying the law. Such criticism fuels an overdrawn
fear that elitist judges will ride roughshod over the values cher-
ished by good common folk." This is nonsense and should be
acknowledged as such."
82. Volition is no more a mental event than any other taxonomical element com-
prising specific or general intents. The point is that some complexes in the multiple
drafts of consciousness can be reconstructed in a manner that readily achieves con-
sensus. To say that volition can be obvious from the bare facts is simply to say that
volition, though always a conversational question of morality, can sometimes generate
so little conversation (moral or scientific) that it appears not to be a question at all.
In such cases, nothing is gained by unnatural attenuations of idle chatter. Simply call
it a determined fact and get on with it.
83. Although the trope is employed mainly by political conservatives against activ-
ist liberal judges, this is not invariably the case. Recall the liberal allocutions in the
wake of President Reagan's nomination of Judge Bork to the United States Supreme
Court. See generally Ted Gest, Special Interest Groups Deploy Their Troops in the
Fight Over Robert Bork, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 24, 1987, at 24. For a con-
servative condemnation of the trope, see Bruce Fein, Put Away Sword of Damocles,
84 A.B.A. J. 112 (Mar. 1998). The author, a former associate deputy Attorney General
in the Reagan administration, acknowledges that life tenure might tempt a judge to
an impeachable offense of intentionally subordinating the Constitution to personal
values, but argues that anticipatory confirmation purges are an inappropriate safe-
guard and a serious threat to "the sparkling brilliance of judicial independence." Id.
Mr. Fein noted that Chief Justice Rehnquist, no fan of judicial activism, has praised
"an independent judiciary with the authority to finally interpret a written constitu-
tion . . . [as] one of the crown jewels of our system of government today" and criti-
cized conservative senators for stalling confirmation votes. Id.
84. Additional corrective measures proposed by Professor Wilson include enhanced
legislative oversight of court decisions with significant precedential effect. See WILSON,
supra note 3, at 104. These proposals run contrary to a fundamental premise of sepa-
ration of powers: legislative representatives, precisely because they have a greater
stake in the popular will, are insensitive to rights and equitable claims of minorities.
As courts protect these claims, they are necessarily unpopular, and judicial insulation
is a positive thing. The balance of power between the comparatively democratic leg-
islature and the comparatively elitist judiciary is a delicate one, but legislative bodies
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Ironically, if traditional concepts of individual moral responsi-
bility and retributive punishment are to be preserved, it will re-
quire a judiciary that is more elite, not less so." Judges are
empowered to make awesome and dreadful moral choices, not
because society wills it, but because no one else can make the
choices effectively. Honestly acknowledging this fact cannot
make the situation worse. Acknowledgment will make us think
seriously about the criteria we employ for choosing judges. The
critical prerequisites are not intellectual acumen coupled with
expertise in some imagined science of law, but rather habitual
possession of classic virtues such as courage, justice, wisdom,
and temperance."8 We can benefit from the Aristotelian insight
that, in the final analysis, we can come to no better definition
of a just act than to say it is an act done by a just person,8 7
in America already have the edge in directing the course of criminal law as the pub-
lic wills. See id. at 83 (comparing the English and American systems, concluding, in
part, that statistical differences are explained by the susceptibility of American
prosecutors and courts to "[t]he collective force of strong popular feelings").
85. The judicial model can also be characterized as more feminine, incorporating
more in the way of empathic flexibility as opposed to the masculine tendency toward
uniform rules. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
86. The point has been made eloquently by Anthony D'Amato:
Perhaps the most important nonacademic consequence of Pragmatic
Indeterminacy is the issue of how we select judges .... Although media
commentators tell us to appoint judges who are learned in the law, who
did well in law school, and who have the ability to craft sophisticated,
persuasive opinions, the media is as usual a couple of decades behind.
For the ability of a judge to state the law in a sophisticated way
has ... practically nothing to do with what we should really be con-
cerned about-fairness and justice. The more we require our judges to be
verbally skilled practitioners of the legal art, the less we can expect
them to have found room in their lives for actual empathic experiences,
for the wisdom that comes from contemplating the human condition, and
for the maturity of judgment that comes from reflecting upon what to do
in thousands of daily interactions with other people in diverse contexts.
What we need on the bench are qualities of compassion, fairness, mercy,
good judgment, experience of many walks of life, sensitivity, humanism,
and empathy. Since judges cannot be constrained by law-words, they
should be the kind of people who feel constrained by justice.
D'Amato, supra note 14, at 187-88 (footnotes omitted).
87. See ARISTOTLE, NICHoMAcHEAN ETHIcs 311-13 (G.P. Goold ed., H. Rackham
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed., 1934) (representing section 1137a, lines 5 to 30
in the original work). Aristotle compares the practice of justice to the practice of
medicine. Contrary to our unreflective perception, it is not the physician's act that
heals the patient, but the physician who lives in a manner according with his knowl-
edge of medicine; so also an act manifests justice only because of the basic attitude
or habits of the person. See id. at 313 (representing section 1137a, line 24 in the
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and from the Platonic realization that the people who really
care about justice are never those who speak as representatives
for the mob.88 It is the philosophers, the strong poets who cre-
ate the metaphors by which we define ourselves, who are prop-
erly to be sought as judges.8 9 The justice they do, like the
truth or facts they discern, is a way of making sense of the
world by making conversation. Justice is not an observation of
facts that the law measures against a scientific archetype of the
human mind.
The alternative to this mode of radical honesty is the contin-
ued atrophy of any common standard of moral responsibility,
the increasing sense that criminal guilt or innocence is subject
to empirical-scientific verification according to standards that
only scientists truly comprehend, inherent confusion over why
such judgments are not simply left to scientists, and anxiety
that individual lives will be robbed of dignity if we actually
subscribe to the logic we profess. Insofar as guilt determina-
tions are moral decisions, they cannot be entrusted to scientists
as a matter of expertise. Insofar as moral decisions must be
infused with literary-interpretive understandings of scientific
data, they cannot be entrusted to whomever shows up for jury
duty. It is more realistic to raise our expectations of judges
than of juries.
Delineating the impossibility of a privileged language of na-
ture or God, which scientists discover to facilitate a true under-
standing of the universe, Richard Rorty relates a story of Wil-
liam James, who told of hiking through the Appalachians and
being overcome with revulsion on encountering a muddy clear-
ing with jagged stumps of trees, a shabby log cabin and a pig-
pen.9" But when a farmer emerged and expressed pride in his
cultivation of the surrounding coves, James realized that he
had fallen into "a certain blindness in human beings."9 When
original work).
88. See Plato, The Apology, in PLATO COMPLETE WORKS 26 (John M. Cooper ed.,
& G.M.A. Grube trans., 1984). Socrates notes that the popular support of his accus-
ers, founded in jealously and slander, has been fatal to many innocent men and will
continue to be so. See id.
89. Cf Plato, The Republic, in PLATO COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 88, at 1044-
46 (delineating the good soul that is the essential prerequisite of the good judge).
90. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 38 (1989).
91. Id.
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James looked at the scene, he saw only ugliness and believed
there could be no other story. But to the people who had
chopped the trees and set the logs, the clearing "was ... a
symbol redolent with moral memories and sang a very paean of
duty, struggle and success."92 Rorty tells the story to make a
point about Freud:
I take Freud to have spelled out James's point in more
detail, helping us overcome particularly intractable cases of
blindness by letting us see the "peculiar ideality" of events
which exemplify, for example, sexual perversion, extreme
cruelty, ludicrous obsession, and manic delusion. He let us
see each of these as the private poem of the pervert, the
sadist, or the lunatic: each as richly textured and "redolent
of moral memories" as our own life. He lets us see what
moral philosophy describes as extreme, inhuman, and un-
natural, as continuous with our own activity. But, and this
is the crucial point, he does not do so in the traditional
philosophical, reductionist way. He does not tell us that art
is really sublimation or philosophical system-building merely
paranoia, or religion merely a confused memory of the fierce
father. He is not saying that human life is merely a con-
tinuous rechanneling of libidinal energy. He is not interest-
ed in invoking a reality-appearance distinction, in saying
that anything is "merely" or "really" something quite differ-
ent. He just wants to give us one more redescription of
things to be filed alongside all others, one more vocabulary,
one more set of metaphors which he thinks have a chance
of being used and thereby literalized.93
This pragmatic angle on Freud marks a liberation for forensic
psychology.94 If there is no Truth which psychology merely re-
flects95 any more than there is Truth from which law is de-
92. Id. (quoting William James, On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings, in
TALKS TO TEACHERS ON PSYCHOLOGY 134 (Frederick Burkhardt & Fredson Bowers
eds., 1983)).
93. Id. at 38-39.
94. According to Wittgenstein, Freud did not often see himself from this pragmat-
ic angle-hence, the confusion of causes and reasons. See WrITGENSTEIN, supra note
24, at 41-52.
95. The argument that psychoanalysis is unscientific insofar as its hypotheses are
clinically unverifiable and its methods self-validating has contributed greatly to the
decline of psychoanalysis as a dominant force, particularly in American psychology.
For a comprehensive survey of conflicting theories of the character of psychoanalysis,
including accounts reflected in popular culture and divergent positions within the
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duced, the myth of responsibility as a fact to be found is finally
put to rest. It reveals as illusory the question of whether partic-
ular expert testimony is sufficiently scientific to be admitted
into evidence."6 Expert testimony should not be presented to
jurors if indeed it is facts they are charged with finding. There
should be no undue fear that the sentencing judge will be ille-
gitimately influenced by incredible theories, 7 provided that she
acknowledges that she is not considering expert testimony in
order to discover whether the accused truly deserves retribu-
tion, but in order to construct a story by which a community
can make sense of the crime and punishment. Making sense of
a defendant's actions by attempting to understand his view of
matters does not preclude retributive punishment any more
than empathically understanding the victims in their agony
mandates .it. These are but parts of a story. They interplay
with other parts, spoken and unspoken, and are made intelligi-
psychoanalytic community, see NATHAN G. HALE, JR., THE RISE AND CRISIS OF PSY-
CHOANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES 345-79 (1995).
96. See WILSON, supra note 3, at 10-21 (criticizing "syndrome science"); John E.B.
Myers, Expert Testimony Describing Psychological Syndromes, 24 PAC. L.J. 1449, 1459-
64 (1993) (questioning the validity of expert testimony regarding "syndromes" not
established in contemporary medicine). Both authors comment on the debate sur-
rounding the continuing validity of the test articulated in Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which requires expert testimony be deduced from "a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery ... sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. The confu-
sion over what is or is not scientific is largely circumvented if the judge is the only
person to whom such testimony is presented, provided that the judge possesses suffi-
cient intelligence to understand the assertions and presuppositions of competing ex-
pert testimony. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. A judge of sufficient in-
telligence would not consider scientific evidence admitted in cases criticized by Profes-
sor Wilson: the testimony of an expert in the Rodney King trial, with a frame-by-
frame analysis of the video of four police officers delivering fifty-six blows, that King's
actions depicted evidence in each frame which might have indicated to the officers
that he was displaying hostile action. See WILSON, supra note 3, at 15. Consider also
the expert testimony in the first trial of Erik and Lyle Menendez that research on
snails could explain how the brothers' brains could have been rewired as a result of
alleged parental abuse. See id. at 17. Judges who are now reluctant to exclude such
evidence, erring on the side of caution, or to throw out questionable verdicts would
be freer if they could accept all evidence which only they could interpret, and if they
were accountable to the legal community as to why they accepted some theories over
others.
97. Professor Morse seems to fear psychoanalysis as such a theory. See Stephen
J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Uncon-
scious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971, 983-1043 (1982). Professor Dershowitz's glossary of syn-
dromes proves there are unreliable experts willing to testify to any marginally plausi-
ble theory that might lead to acquittal. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 321-41.
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ble by the storyteller who speaks in the genre of law and, how-
ever inauspiciously, convinces her audience that hers is at least
the kind of story they want to hear."
Professor Morse correctly asserts that psychodynamic expla-
nations in the Freudian mode are not "scientifically validated
causal accounts for behavior," but rather "a literary-interpretive
account of the meaning of behavior."9 Morse, however, misses
the point when he subsequently concludes that "psychodynamic
explanations are not relevant to the ascription of criminal re-
sponsibility and the apportionment of punishment." 0 The
point that Morse misses is that we cannot ascribe criminal
responsibility and apportion punishment without accounting for
the meaning of behavior; ascribing responsibility and appor-
tioning punishment are nothing more or less than ways of mak-
ing behavior mean something, the very means of meaning.'0'
Believing otherwise merely enhances an oblivion to our own
emotional boundaries at work, allowing us to believe that we
choose to inflict punishment because we have no choice, that it
is all a matter of finding a mental event as it really existed
instead of creating the "event" as a picture to make sense of
the person we are asked to judge. We thus give our own emo-
tive identities, reflected in the defendant, the status of univer-
sal truth. But we need not persist in the illusion that guilt is
no more than a determination of object-responsibility and that a
defendant's mens rea is-at least in principle-objectively deter-
minable by scientific method.' 2 Professor Morse has observed
98. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and
the Literary Imagination, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 1477 (1995) (presenting aspects of artis-
tic literary sensibility as essential to the judicial function).
99. Morse, supra note 97, at 975; cf. HALE, supra note 95, at 374-75 (summariz-
ing the "hermeneutic bent" of psychoanalytic theory deriving from philosophers in the
mode of Wilhelm Dilthey, Jurgen Habermas, and Paul Ricouer, according to whom
the interpretive constructions between patient and therapist "lay somewhere between
traditional science and hermeneutics").
100. Morse, supra note 97, at 1043.
101. To the logical positivists in the Vienna Circle mode, the meaning of a word
was its verification-a fixed quality. To Wittgenstein, a word attained meaning only
in relation to what "stands fast around it," by unfixed contexts of word use and
forms of life of word users. These differing attitudes toward language are at the basis
of the various debates at issue here, with legal formalists reflecting a scientific mode
of fixed meanings and deconstructionists reflecting a more philosophic mode of con-
texts and forms of life. See supra note 22.
102. In justifying the use of expert psychological testimony to negate the mens rea
144 [Vol. 33:107
1999] DECONSTRUCTING MENS REA 145
what Wittgenstein perceived: Freudian analysis yields reasons,
not causes. °3 But a judicial morality story, like any other,
requisite to criminal responsibility, Professor Morse correctly observes that determin-
ing criminal mens rea is no different than determining other common legal issues,
such as a testator's soundness of mind or a party's understanding of the nature of a
contract:
In all cases, the court must reconstruct a past mental state largely
on the basis of inferences from the defendant's utterances and actions at
the relevant time. This process is often difficult because we can never be
sure what is (or was) in the mind of another. Even the person in question
may have faulty recollection, for various reasons, about his past mental
processes.
Morse, supra note 1, at 10-11 (emphasis added). "State of mind" is not, by this ac-
count, a fiction employed to make sense of one's place in a memory narrative of mul-
tiple drafts, but a real event. This is impossible without Dennett's characterization of
a "Cartesian Theater," where a Central Meaner once viewed different editions of a
film and designated an official version against which the recollected copy can be com-
pared. See DENNETT, supra note 41, at 253-54.
103. Professor Morse in effect acknowledges this distinction, following Professor Mi-
chael Moore's analysis of responsibility language and unconscious motivation. See, e.g.,
Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1626-
32 (1980). As Morse explains,
Michael Moore has argued persuasively that unconscious motivation al-
most never vitiates responsibility for actors who otherwise meet the crite-
ria for criminal guilt. A demonstration that behavior has causes does not
per se undermine responsibility, because causation is not equivalent to,
or proof of, a legal excuse .... Responsibility language and concepts
refer to persons acting for reasons; causation language and concepts refer
to things happening because of antecedent events. The criteria for legal
responsibility are simply that the actor is rational in the sense that he
or she acts for reasons that fit a practical syllogism, and that the actor
meets the particular legal requirements of liability. Thus, a reasonably
rational defendant who performs the actus reus with the requisite mens
rea is responsible for the crime. The language of the prima facie case in
criminal law is one of actors acting for reasons--causation is usually
irrelevant. It is possible to redefine all behavior, including the formation
of mens rea, as events or effects. As such, all have sufficient antecedent
causes-physiological, sociological, psychodynamic, and so on. With such a
redefinition, however, one is no longer talking the language of persons,
reasons, choices, and responsibility. Instead, one is talking about persons
and their behavior as objects and events. The two realms of discourse
should not be confused, because if causation is equated with excuse, it
leads to the reductionist conclusion that no one is responsi-
ble-presumably, all behavior has causes.
Morse, supra note 97, at 1028-29 (footnotes omitted). Both Professors Moore and
Morse would minimize this confusion by precluding expert testimony regarding the
ultimate issue of criminal responsibility. But this solution gives rise to a qualitatively
more subtle confusion. Allowing any scientific experts to testify implies that there is
a scientific truth to be discovered. Moreover, the sweeping exclusion of psychodynamic
and other unscientific theories, if the rule encompasses sentencing hearings, under-
mines the moral insight that is the proximate benefit of psychology and the sense of
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:107
deals in reasons or it deals in nothing. And whatever else
might be said of psychoanalysis, it explains otherwise chaotic
and painful phenomena in human terms. If it is literary rather
than scientific, it is all the more useful for that reason.
The problem of "abuse excuses," tangled webs of emotional
narrative confusing jurors as to what constitutes science and
what science must establish to create reasonable doubt as to
one or more elements of a crime, is very real."4 But it has
largely been taken for granted that any solution must take the
form of minimizing the literary-interpretive devices that give
meaning to our lives by forcing as many decidedly nonrational
processes (like ascribing a state of mind) into as few scientific
categories as possible." 5 If the rules no longer work, the theo-
justice which has impelled courts and legislatures to employ psychology, however im-
prudently. Any judgment entailing retributive punishment cannot be scientific because
retribution can only be justified by an implicit appeal to phenomena inexpressible in
scientific language, whether these phenomena are imagined as above and beyond
thoughtspeech, as one might envision God, or as so integral a part of thoughtspeech
that they cannot be signified, as one cannot prove logically that one has a body. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text. In other words, Professor Morse replicates G.
E. Moore's mistake of "knowing" with scientific certainty that he has an arm that
raises, and Russell's mistake of "knowing" there is no rhinoceros in the room. To
characterize these phenomena even as verifiable is to falsify them in a radical way.
Similarly, to characterize an accused's state of mind as an event that really hap-
pened, implying that there is a scientifically correct version, is to miscast an interpre-
tation as an objective truth. This was Freud's mistake, as characterized by
Wittgenstein:
If you are led by psycho-analysis to say that really you thought so and
so or that really your motive was so and so, this is not a matter of dis-
covery, but of persuasion. In a different way you could have been per-
suaded of something different. Of course, if psycho-analysis cures your
stammer, it cures it, and that is an achievement. One thinks of certain
results of psycho-analysis as a discovery Freud made, as apart from
something persuaded to you [sic] by a psycho-analyst, and I wish to say
that this is not the case.
WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 24, at 27.
104. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. The problem is not in the statis-
tical success rate of these defenses but in the resulting confusion of jurors and the
erosion of public confidence in the legal system. The very fact that Professor
Dershowitz is able to catalogue more than 50 of these diminished capacity variants
bespeaks a culture in search of a moral center of gravity. See DERSHOWITZ, supra
note 2, at 321-41. For intelligent, sensitive, yet unsentimental narrative, insights on
the modem incapacity to think clearly about moral judgments, see DAVID GELERNTER,
DRAWING LIFE: SURVIVING THE UNABOMBER (1997).
105. See WILSON, supra note 3, at 7-21 (distinguishing between social science and
hard science, arguing that the former is "not science at all" and so should not pass
the Frye test); Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of
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ry goes, they must be made ever more rule-like, allowing less
room for idiosyncratic, emotive-interpretive influence, reducing
everything to just the facts, however unfact-like the phenomena
may be. An alternate solution that has not been given due
consideration is that we should change the way we think about
such basic concepts as responsibility, guilt, and mind. The
reductionistic approach, which views justice primarily as an
aspiration of logical transcendence and universality. 6 and,
thus, imposes rigid categories, has dominated our legal culture
from a time to which "the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary."' 7 Perhaps it is to the memory of woman that we
should thus appeal, where justice is seen more in a light of
emotive connection and particularity," opening a way for
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 600-26 (1978) (arguing that mental
health experts' testimony should be confined to what they observe and to provide
hard data in the comparatively few cases in which it is available, always precluding
speculation regarding unconscious motivation); Moore, supra note 103, at 1564-67,
1674-75 (explicating a fundamental inconsistency in psychoanalytic theory, which
would both increase attributions of responsibility through identifying unconscious moti-
vation and decrease attributions on the ground the motives were not conscious, Moore
concludes that both factions are wrong and that "there is nothing unscientific or irra-
tional about a moral system that attributes responsibility of the most serious sort
only to behavior involving conscious knowledge"). But cf Richard J. Bonnie & Chris-
topher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The
Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 496-522 (1980) (asserting that the
focus of reform should center on the process of gathering data and that clinical diag-
nostic discrepancies, or "evaluator distortion," can be significantly reduced by (1) in-
creasing the sensitivity of the clinician to her own distorting prejudices, much in the
manner of psychoanalysts, whose training requires them to undergo analysis them-
selves to better understand countertransference; (2) inteijecting additional observers
into interview assessments via videotape or two-way mirrors; (3) providing feedback
against which the interviewer can assess his own style and prejudices; and (4) ex-
changing clinical information between the defense and prosecution once the defendant
decides on a clinically-based defense).
106. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Ci. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1988).
The masculine perspective engendering classical liberal theory is based on a perceived
inherent separateness of human beings who are protected from annihilation only by
transcending their natural inclinations through moral principles bespeaking equality,
rights, and duties. See .generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 151-74
(1982).
107. Idaho ex rel. Hamen v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1101 (1979). The phrase is taken
from the outmoded English common law of custom, a means by which the public
could acquire rights over private property. To some, the words generally connote the
ossificatory aspect of precendential reasoning.
108. See West, supra note 106, at 13-19. Just as men perceive an inherent sepa-
rateness of persons, women experience a fundamental material connectedness to life
by virtue of their capacity to create children; thus, intimacy, not autonomy, is the
ground of social relations, and so morality is cast in terms of responsibility to others
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complex complements of intuitive and empathic apprehen-
sions." 9 The way of masculine reductionism brings the beauty
of order. The beauty of justice, however, remains ever in con-
flict with order's pretensions. Justice, it would seem, speaks
mainly in reasons, the culturally weaker language. Small won-
der her voice is so difficult to hear.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The human desire for a determinate system of law, fueled
essentially by fear of chaos, has the seductive effect of making
law appear as a kind of science. This effect produces an illusory
identification of law, which aspires to make life mean some-
thing by ordering human conduct, and science, which aspires to
verify phenomena for the practical purpose of mastering the
universe to use it. Thus, our linguistic structures attempt to
resolve very different modes of thought with symbols that are
different in kind, but the differences are comprehended only by
instead of principles of autonomous rights. See id.
109. Professor Gilligan examines the developmental process by which adolescents of
both genders become cognizant of the tension between the conflicting claims of auton-
omy and intimacy, concluding, in part,
[I]n the transition from adolescence to adulthood, the dilemma itself is
the same for both sexes, a conflict between integrity and care. But ap-
proached from different perspectives, this dilemma generates the recogni-
tion of opposite truths. These different perspectives are reflected in two
different moral ideologies, since separation is justified by an ethic of
rights while attachment is supported by an ethic of care.
The morality of rights is predicated on equality and centered on
the understanding of fairness, while the ethic of responsibility relies on
the concept of equity, the recognition of differences in need. While the
ethic of rights is a manifestation of equal respect, balancing the claims of
other and self, the ethic of responsibility rests on an understanding that
gives rise to compassion and care. ...
Thus, starting from very different points, from the different ideolo-
gies of justice and care, the men and women in the study come, in the
course of becoming adult, to a greater understanding of both points of
view .... Recognizing the dual contexts of justice and care, they realize
that judgment depends on the way the problem is framed.
GILLIGAN, supra note 106, at 164-65, 167. The exclusion of reasons from the discourse
of criminal responsibility, thus, can be viewed as an inadequate and one-sided remedy
to the confusion of juries. Judging behavior apart from its meaning, however appeal-
ing in its simplicity, bespeaks a kind of cultural inability to integrate conflicting
moral claims into a fully human frame.
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close reading. One manifestation of this confusion is the inabil-
ity to distinguish a discourse of causes, concerned with verifi-
able phenomena, from a discourse of reasons, concerned with
the meaning of human lives. Because attributions of re-
sponsibility invariably involve both modes of language, the
confusion is aggravated. So we are led to believe, via grammati-
cal similarities, that causes and reasons are only different as-
pects of identical phenomena.
State of mind, then, is perceived as an event scientifically
measurable within a temporal frame, a kind of picture
capturable on thought film. State of mind, however, is more
accurately described as a conclusory label applied retrospective-
ly to make sense of multiple streams of consciousness. Although
state of mind must employ certain empirical references, it is
essentially a judgment of value that our language confuses us
into envisioning as a scientific fact discernible through scientific
expertise. Much of the linguistic confusion can be untangled by
understanding various distinctions, such as Wittgenstein's caus-
es and reasons,"° Dan-Cohen's object-responsibility and sub-
ject-responsibility,"' Dennett's design stance and intentional
stance," and Jonsen's pattern of attribution and pattern of
appropriation."'
Even when these distinctions are applied, however, there
remains an overlap, a point of incorrigible entanglement where
scientifically measurable causality is a precondition of moral
judgments and where moral presuppositions determine, at least
unconsciously, the factors perceived as causal. A useful concept
to understand this inevitable entanglement is Saint Augustine's
formulation of original sin, which necessarily implies that any
human moral judgment is ambiguous. Thus, any judicial deci-
sion is always a matter of choosing a lesser evil, and in this
sense no decision is ever good." This notion of sin also is
useful in setting an epistemic ground of morality, corresponding
in large measure to Wittgenstein's distinction between what can
be said and what can only be shown: we know what is
110. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 25, 39-50 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 53 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 54, 56.
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foundationally good not as a matter of logic, but as a matter of
being human. If a person has no grasp of the foundations, the
person is not fully human and is crazy. The consequences of the
craziness, encompassing more, but not less, than the conse-
quences of a person's actions, determine whether the person's
craziness is to be pitied or abhorred. The operative means of
measurement also is foundational, and so it too is a matter of
what it means to be objectively human, the objectivity being
uncapturable by language. The unspeakable foundation merely
points to something exceeding spacetime and thoughtspeech,
something that cannot even be thought in the ordinary sense.
There are several practical corollaries to these insights. First,
because a defendant's state of mind, whether for purposes of
establishing insanity or negating the mens rea of a criminal
offense, is not properly characterized as a fact, the issue should
not be presented to a jury. Second, because there invariably
remains an area of overlap between fact and value, state of
mind is necessarily an important consideration and cannot be
left out of the criminal justice system except at the expense of
silently omitting the predicate "justice." Third, given the prior
corollaries, the best means of accomplishing justice is by means
of a bifurcated trial, with juries determining only matters more
appropriately designated as factual and sentencing judges con-
sidering the refinements of responsibility attribution. In the
established legal taxonomy, this would amount to the partial
responsibility variant of the doctrine of diminished capacity. 115
Fourth, the debate over what qualifies as scientific testimony
should be minimized once we acknowledge that state of mind is
not a scientifically verifiable fact. For example, questions such
as whether psychodynamic models are appropriately employed
lose importance and the question of which psychological theo-
ries are credible is a matter left to the judge. Fifth, we need to
modify our criteria for choosing judges, caring far less about
law school class rank and far more about the person's education
and experience before and after law school. We should value
intelligence, truly liberal education, experiences which would
build empathy, habitual manifestations of the cardinal virtues
of courage, justice,, wisdom, temperance, and the theological
115. See supra note 1.
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virtues of faith, hope, and love. Because judges expressly
charged with greater responsibility will need enhanced rhetori-
cal skills to explain their decisions, we should seek people who
are genuinely articulate, but in a manner that will clarify con-
fusions of language, not promote them by talking a good game
about a science of law that does not exist. Above all, political
connections should be presumed a disqualifying factor, with the
burden on the judicial candidate to rebut the presumption.
Those who are good at pandering to mobs, or good at pandering
to others who are good at pandering to mobs, generally repre-
sent a personality type to whom considerations of justice are
secondary. Like Plato's philosopher-kings, the people we must
seek will not particularly want the jobs."6
Finally, we must not be deterred from reform by the appar-
ent strength of the established order. The sheer numbers of
persons who hold vested interests in the present system seem
overwhelming, and changing any essential characteristics will
be difficult. But America is also ripe for change. This is evi-
denced by the numbers who believe the present order is in
crisis. As Professor Wilson has noted, the statistics matter less
than public perceptions."7 If so many believe there is a crisis
not only in the criminal justice system, but in the moral sensi-
bilities of the whole country, there is in fact a crisis.. People are
very confused about what morality is, how to measure it in
themselves and others, and how to talk about it in a way that
is accessible to the public at large. Continuing on our present
course will have the same effect as, for example, the outmoded
medical practice of bleeding a patient to treat anemia. This
need not be so. As I hope to have demonstrated, there are ways
of clarifying present linguistic confusions about good and evil.
We ignore them at our peril.
116. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 3.
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